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Chapter 1
Introduction
The three essays that form this thesis concern contributions made by private
individuals to various types of public goods. The nature of the contributions
ranges from enforceable taxes and fees to purely voluntary donations of time
and money. The methods employed include microeconomic theory, an eco-
nomics laboratory experiment and an econometric analysis of time-use diary
data.
Public goods were rst formally described by Paul Samuelson as col-
lective consumptiongoods that can be consumed by anyone and everyone,
at the expense of no one elses consumption. Traditional economic theory
anticipates free-riding in the production of such goods (Samuelson, 1954, pp.
388-389):
[With private goods, t]he servant of the ethical observer would
not have to make explicit decisions about each persons detailed
consumption and work[, ... whereas with public goods,] no de-
centralized pricing system can serve to determine optimally these
levels of collective consumption. [...] By departing from his indoc-
trinated rules, any one person can hope to snatch some benet
in a way not possible under the self-policing competitive pricing
of private goods[.]
In other words, with a public good, ensuring that supply satises demand
is doubly challenging because total demand for the good is unknown and must
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rst be estimated; and once this is set, something is required that will compel
individuals to pay for the supply.
In practice, various mechanisms exist to facilitate the provision of public
goods. The classic examples of street lighting and national military services
tend to be nanced through general taxation imposed on citizens by their
governments. Demand for other public goods is revealed by people form-
ing associations that then appeal for funding from both public and private
sources. Examples of such public goods include the preservation of wildlife
and the countryside, the upkeep of public libraries and museums, and re-
search to improve knowledge in the prevention of diseases.
One question of particular importance to governments is the extent to
which the nancing of a public good through compulsory taxation crowds out
voluntary contributions, that is, people who would otherwise have provided
the good decide not to contribute because it is already being funded through
other means (see, for example, Bergstrom et al., 1986). There is an economic
argument for tax breaks on voluntary contributions wherever such crowding
out is incomplete, i.e. where increasing public funding by e1 results in a
reduction of voluntary contributions of less than e1. This is because it would
then be cheaper for a government to o¤er the tax break and have private
individuals pay for the good than it would be to fund the good directly
through the public nances. If, on the other hand, crowding out is complete,
it should make no di¤erence on aggregate whether a public good is nanced
through general taxation or through voluntary contributions. Any change in
the level of compulsory contributions would be o¤set by a change in voluntary
contributions of equal magnitude.
The rst essay in chapter 2 is about the provision of higher education,
with a focus on compulsory contributions to this good. It is assumed that
government is prepared to fund education to a certain extent through general
taxation but that the remaining portion is to be nanced either through
fees at the beginning of studies or through a graduate tax on completion of
studies, both of which are to be paid by the students who benet directly
from the education. In the model, there is therefore also a private component
to higher education that serves to improve the welfare of the student being
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educated, through a higher expected wage on graduation. However, the main
point of the model is to investigate and compare the e¤ects of the di¤erent
types of contributions (tuition fees or graduate tax) on universitiesincentives
to enhance the quality of education, and graduatesincentives to work hard
later in life, which have implications for society as a whole. In this respect,
higher education is essentially a public good, as has been argued previously
by Tilak (2008, p. 452):
[Higher] education satises both the essential features: the spread
of benets from an educated citizenry cannot be restricted to a
small population, nor is the quantum of benets received by some
a¤ected by the level of benets others receive.
Indeed, without higher education, total economic production in the model
in chapter 2 would be lower. A graduate tax is more public-spirited than tu-
ition fees in that through such a tax, the more successful graduates e¤ectively
subsidize the education of their less successful counterparts.
The analysis reveals a trade-o¤: compared to tuition fees, a graduate tax
reduces work incentives because a graduates marginal revenue from work is
lower. At the same time, such a tax induces universities to improve their
teaching quality as they stand to gain from increased tax revenue.
Another typical trait of a public good is exposed when it is demonstrated
that if revenues are distributed evenly among universities, the universities
free-ride on otherse¤orts to increase education quality and so they settle for
a lower quality of education. This problem is then solved in a straightforward
way, by allocating each university the tax revenue from its own alumni.
The question of which system leads to more education overall is also
addressed. It is shown how a budget-balancing graduate tax encourages
higher university participation than the equivalent tuition fee. This is due
both to the tax transferring the volatility in future income from risk-averse
students to the risk-neutral state and to its exacting price discrimination on
students of di¤ering ability, since students of higher ability are prepared to
pay more for their studies.
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Chapter 2 concludes with the observation that universities are becoming
increasingly reliant on alumni to top up their nances through voluntary
contributions, which include both lifetime gifts and bequests upon death.
Whether people are presented with the opportunity to add to the public
good through free will, or commanded to do so by law, can a¤ect what-
ever motivations underlie their contributions and ultimately how much of
the good is produced. This is the subject of the second essay (chapter 3).
Continuing the theme of taxation, the essay reports results from a laboratory
experiment that tests the e¤ect of forcing contributions, through a charity
tax, on peoples voluntary donations to charitable organizations.
In order for organizations to register as charities and be eligible to receive
donations, there must be demonstrable public benet.1 Traditionally, econo-
mists modeled charity as a pure public good, where the individual donor
derives utility from total supply of the good, but not from his or her per-
sonal contribution to it. Andreoni (1988, p. 57) argues that this approach
does not stand up to empirical testing, noting that guilt, sympathy, an ethic
for duty, a taste for fairness, or a desire for recognitioncan all play a role
in a persons charitable giving.
Insofar as people are intrinsically motivated, exerting extrinsic pressure to
generate action can have consequences that standard economic theory would
not normally predict (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
The experiment presented in chapter 3 seeks to investigate the e¤ects of
imposing a small, a medium and a large income tax on donor behavior, where
the tax revenue and donations both go to the same good cause. Contrary
to economic reasoning, it is found that the small charity tax crowds out
donations from male participants to the extent that total contributions to
the cause are reduced. This result cannot be explained by the theory of warm
glow (Andreoni, 1990), which predicts only partial crowding out. However, an
explanation for the observed behavior is provided by psychological reactance
theory (Brehm, 1966): male participants in the experiment were willing to
1For example, in England and Wales, this is laid out in the Charities Act 2011 §4 The
public benet requirement. In Germany it is dened in Abgabenordnung §52Gemeinnützige
Zwecke.
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donate generously to the cause without any interference from a tax, but
when forced to make a small contribution through a small tax, they reacted
adversely by reducing total contributions to below their naturallevel.
Somewhat surprisingly, the charity tax is found to crowd in donations
from female participants. While the experimental evidence is insu¢ cient to
provide a conclusive explanation for this gender di¤erence (the experiment
was not designed to focus on gender), men and women have previously been
shown to di¤er in their psychological reactions in other contexts (Regan and
Brehm, 1972; Brehm and Brehm, 1981).
Having studied di¤erent forms of compulsory contributions and how these
interact with peoples voluntary contributions of money, the nal part of this
thesis is about voluntary contributions of time to public goods. Chapter 4
presents an empirical analysis that compares contributions of time to formal
charitable organizations with contributions of time to help others in informal
settings. This chapter sets out to examine the di¤erences between men and
women in their volunteering behavior.
The data stem from detailed diaries of how people spend their time that
were recorded in the German Time Use Survey 2001/02. A bivariate probit
model is used to estimate simultaneously the probability of volunteering for-
mally and the probability of volunteering informally. This approach controls
for endogeneity in the decisions to perform both activities. The e¤ects of
observable factors such as gender, age and education are thus calculated for
each type of volunteering and then an estimate for the residual correlation
between formal and informal volunteering is produced. Any further, unob-
servable, factors that impact on the decisions to participate in formal and
informal volunteering are captured in this correlation parameter.
The residual correlation estimate for the female sample is positive: the
women are more likely to volunteer formally if they also volunteer infor-
mally, which suggests that the decisions are complementary. However, for
men, the decisions to volunteer formally and informally are not found to be
signicantly related.
A potential explanation for the observed participation of women in both
formal and informal volunteering is that in Germany, many more women
5
than men do not work, or work only part-time, so they might have more
time available for volunteering activities. However, further analysis of the
subsample of full-time workers in fact accentuates the result: the positive
correlation becomes even stronger among women who work full-time.
It is concluded that simple gender di¤erences in labor-force participation
cannot explain the complementary voluntary contributions of women to pub-
lic goods through formal and informal gifts of time. The behavior may be
due to womens particular social networks that become amplied through
paid employment; whether or not this is the case is left for investigation in
future research.
The diverse collection of results presented in this thesis underlines the
complexity inherent to peoples contributions to public goods. Much depends
on context. Combining economics and psychology to study behavior in more
detail can help Samuelsons ethical observer to steer society closer to its
optimal levels of supply and demand.
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Chapter 2
Universities as Stakeholders in
their StudentsCareers On
the Benets of Graduate Taxes
to Finance Higher Education1
2.1 Introduction
The funding of public university education is the subject of current debate
across Europe.2 Courses have traditionally been funded entirely by the state
in several countries, including Germany, where some federal states introduced
tuition fees only recently and subject to controversial discussion, leading some
of the states to abandon them again. In the United Kingdom, universities
have been charging students tuition fees for the past decade, but at levels
that are not su¢ cient to cover the costs of education, and the government has
introduced legislation to triple the maximum chargeable fee. We acknowledge
the pressing need to have students participate in the nancing of their studies.
However, there is signicant risk involved in completing a university course
1This chapter is based on McKenzie and Sliwka (2011).
2For a survey of developments in higher education and an international overview of
funding models see for instance The Economists survey of higher education (Wooldridge,
2005). For an introduction to the various forms of university funding, see Barr (1993).
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successfully and securing future employment. We therefore question whether
up-front tuition fees represent an e¢ cient funding model. The idea of a tax
following graduation from university has been proposed as an alternative
to tuition fees and was embraced by the leader of the opposition in the
UK (Rigby, 2010). In this chapter we consider these two di¤erent means
of nancing higher education from both the studentsand the universities
perspectives.
There is some previous economic literature on the issue of graduate taxes.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) demonstrate in their analysis that a linear income
tax can increase incentives for risk-averse individuals to invest in human capi-
tal. When the returns to such investments are uncertain, the state e¤ectively
takes on a part of the risk via the tax. García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000)
build on this result, relating it to the funding of higher education. They
compare a graduate tax with loan schemes. The graduate tax is preferred
to student loans due to such insurance e¤ects. It is also superior to general
taxation when equity in the economy as a whole is considered. Gary-Bobo
and Trannoy (2008) assume that wages are a function of learnable skill and
innate ability. The authors focus on tuition fees and analyze the decision to
study and student selection on the part of universities under this regime.
In our model, we compare a system of tuition fees with a proportional
graduate tax on future income. The state continues to fund the universities
up to a certain point. Beyond this point, the students are responsible for
nancing their education. When there is no moral-hazard problem, we too
obtain the general result that risk-averse students prefer the graduate tax,
as future income is volatile, and the risk-neutral state assumes part of this
risk via the tax. However, since students di¤er in their abilities, highly able
students are likelier to prefer an up-front fee, as they expect to pay more tax
than their less able counterparts later on. But due to the insurance e¤ect, a
student with an ability at the median prefers the graduate tax.
We then introduce two levels of moral hazard into the model. First, we
allow future income to depend on costly, unobservable e¤ort on the part of
graduates. Subsequently, we incorporate moral hazard with regard to teach-
ing quality provided by universities. We hence end up with a double moral-
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hazard problem, such as has been analyzed in various contexts, for instance
by Cooper and Ross (1985), Demski and Sappington (1991), Romano (1994)
and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995). We nd that while a graduate
tax reduces the incentives for graduates to work hard, it also leads to higher
teaching quality if the revenues are destined for the universities. The reason
is that universities stand to prot from the higher future income of their for-
mer students (which they can a¤ect by raising teaching quality). However, if
revenues from the tax are distributed evenly among universities, a free-rider
problem exists. This problem can be solved if each university is allowed to
receive the revenues raised from the tax paid by its own former students.
In such a system, universities become stakeholders in their studentsfuture
careers. Each university has high incentives to improve teaching quality, as
this increases its studentshuman capital, in turn leading to higher future
wages and thus higher tax revenue, which benets the university directly.
Finally, we endogenize enrolment and show that a budget-balancing grad-
uate tax encourages more students to attend university than would an equiv-
alent up-front tuition fee.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce
the basic model. In section 2.3, we consider a reference case where teaching
quality is an exogenous variable. In section 2.4 we endogenize both grad-
uate e¤ort at the workplace and the quality of teaching at university. In
section 2.5, we determine whether a graduate tax or tuition fees would lead
to a higher number of school-leavers applying for a university degree course.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Basic Model
We consider a country in which there are n equally sized publicly owned
universities and rst assume that the population of students is of xed size
(in section 2.5 we endogenize the decision to study at university and con-
sider which form of funding would lead to more applications). Let there be
a continuum of students I = [0; 1]. Each student i 2 I has constant ab-
solute risk aversion r > 0 and utility function u (w) =  e rw where w is
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the individuals lifetime income. Students vary in their ability, captured by
the variable ai. Following the career-concerns literature (Holmström, 1999;
Dewatripont et al., 1999), abilities are normally distributed across the popu-
lation of students ai  N (ma; 2a).3 There are two periods in the model. In
the rst period, the students attend university. In the second period, each
student (now a graduate) earns income that depends on his human capital
and some random component. The human capital of a graduate is a function
of his ability and the quality of the university education q which we rst treat
as exogenously given.4 We assume that abler students benet more from a
higher quality of education. This is well in line with results from person-
nel psychology showing that in nearly all jobs people with higher cognitive
abilities build up more knowlege and skills than others and do so faster.
See, for instance, the discussion in Schmidt and Hunter (1998). Hence, the
second-period wage of individual i is
Wi = qai + "i
where "i  N (0; 2"). We assume that "i and ai are uncorrelated. The
total cost of education is K. Our risk-neutral state provides B < K from
an education budget to cover part of this cost. To nance the rest, the
state now faces a choice between an up-front tuition fee per student  and a
proportional graduate tax on future income . We allow for a case where the
state chooses not to pay for any of the cost but the state cannot turn a prot
from the private nancing of education B  0. We make the reasonable
assumption that the future income of university graduates is su¢ cient to
cover the cost of their education:
qma > K  B: (2.1)
3Note that ai can become negative with positive probability. However the parameters
ma and 2a may be chosen such that the probability that this is the case is made arbitrarily
small (i.e., Prfai < 0g ! 0 for ma !1 or 2a ! 0).
4In addition to building human capital, a university education can act as a signal of
high ability to the job market. Ismail and Myles (2010) analyze the e¤ects of a graduate
tax within a signaling context.
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2.3 A Reference Case
We rst consider the case where teaching quality is an exogenous variable.
The states budget constraint with a xed fee  isZ 1
0
di = K  B.
Hence, the budget-balancing xed fee is given by  = K   B. When a
graduate tax is imposed, the budget constraint is

Z 1
0
qaidi = K  B.
The graduate tax rate covering the budget decit is hence
 =
K  B
qma
.
We now compare the utility of an individual student i with ability ai
under the two systems. Given our assumption that students are risk averse
with constant absolute risk aversion, the certainty equivalent of student i
with a xed fee is5
E [qai + "i   ]  1
2
r  var [qai + "i   ] ; (2.2)
and with a graduate tax it is
E [(1  ) (qai + "i)]  1
2
r  var [(1  ) (qai + "i)] : (2.3)
First, suppose that the state, having a utilitarian welfare function, selects the
system that maximizes the expected utility of students, taking into account
the distribution of abilities. Note that this corresponds to the choice of an
individual student acting under a veil of ignorance, i.e., not yet knowing his
own individual ability. We obtain the following result:
5See, for instance, Wolfstetter (1999, p. 342).
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Proposition 1 The expected utility of students who do not know their ability
ex ante is maximized when the state implements the graduate tax.
Proof. The graduate tax is preferred if (2.3) exceeds (2.2), taking into
account that abilities are normally distributed. Let 2W = var[qai + "i] =
q22a + 
2
". The graduate tax is preferred i¤
(1  ) qma   1
2
r (1  )2 2W  qma    
1
2
r2W
, 1
2
r2W

1  (1  )2  qma   :
Substituting the (binding) budget constraints for  and , we obtain
1
2
r2W
"
1 

1  K  B
qma
2#
 K  B
qma
qma   (K  B)
, 1
2
r2W
"
1 

1  K  B
qma
2#
 0:
From the viability condition (2.1) we have that qma > K   B. Hence, the
inequality always holds. Q.E.D.
Note that the state here decides as an individual student would, were he
oblivious to his own ability. The reason that the graduate tax is preferred to
an up-front tuition fee is that through the tax, the risk-neutral state insures
the risk-averse students against uncertainty in their future incomes.
However, individual students typically will have information regarding
their abilities and may di¤er in their preferences about the system. We
therefore investigate individual studentspreferences for one of the systems
when the state is only interested in balancing the budget. We nd:
Proposition 2 When students are aware of their personal ability, those up
to a threshold ability level bai prefer a proportional graduate tax on future
income. Beyond this cuto¤ value, students of high ability ai > bai prefer the
up-front fee. The threshold bai is greater than the median (mean) ability ma.
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Proof. Student i will prefer the graduate tax if and only if (2.3)  (2.2).
This inequality is equivalent to
(1  ) qai   1
2
r (1  )2 2"  qai    
1
2
r2"
, 1
2
r2"

1  (1  )2  qai   :
Substituting the (binding) budget constraints for  and , we obtain
1
2
r2"
K  B
qma

2  K  B
qma

 K  B
qma
qai   (K  B)
, 1
2
r2"
1
qma

2  K  B
qma

 ai
ma
  1
, ai  ma + 1
2
r2"
1
q

2  K  B
qma

=: bai:
From the viability condition (2.1) we have that qma > K   B. It follows
that the median student will also prefer the graduate tax ma < bai. Q.E.D.
The graduate tax still has an insurance e¤ect from the perspective of an
individual student. But when abilities are known, this insurance e¤ect only
covers the unsystematic uctuations "i. In addition, the tax redistributes
income from the abler to the less able students. Students of low ability benet
more from the graduate tax. They will earn less in the future and therefore
have to pay less. However, very able students anticipate their relatively high
expected future incomes and would thus prefer to pay the standard fee today
in return for not having to subsidize the education of others through their
earnings later. Hence, if ai is large enough, the costs from redistribution
outweigh individual risk concerns.
Nevertheless, a student of median ability always prefers the graduate
tax. The reason for this is that the median student pays the same under
both systems in expected terms, but still prots from the insurance e¤ect of
the graduate tax. Hence, a median-voter model would predict that majority
voting between the two systems would lead to the choice of a graduate tax.
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2.4 Moral Hazard
In this section we compare the incentive e¤ects of the graduate tax and xed
tuition fee on graduate e¤ort at the workplace and on university provision
of teaching quality. We start by analyzing the moral-hazard problems sepa-
rately and then consider an integrated model.
2.4.1 Graduate Moral Hazard
In reality, income depends not only on the quality of a university education.
It also depends on a graduates e¤ort once he or she is in employment. We
now modify our wage function to include the e¤ects of graduate e¤ort ei,
with convex cost of e¤ort C (ei) = (c=2) (ei   e)2, where e is the basic level
of e¤ort provided by a graduate, regardless of incentives. We assume that
the e¤ects of higher ability and higher e¤ort complement each other:
Wi (q; ei; ai; "i) = (q + ei) ai + "i:
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 The xed tuition fee provides higher work incentives for grad-
uates.
Proof. The certainty equivalent with the tuition fee (2.2) now becomes
(q + ei) ai     c
2
(ei   e)2   1
2
r2":
The student chooses the e¤ort level that maximizes the above expression.
The rst-order condition is
ai   c (ei   e) = 0
, ei = e+ ai
c
:
The certainty equivalent under the graduate tax (2.3) becomes
(1  ) (q + ei) ai   c
2
(ei   e)2   1
2
r (1  )2 2":
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The student maximizes the above expression with respect to ei for a given
tax . The rst-order condition is
(1  ) ai   c (ei   e) = 0
, ei = e+ (1  ) ai
c
:
This is ai=c less than the e¤ort exerted under the tuition fee. Q.E.D.
Under the tax, graduates e¤ectively only see 1  of the income they generate.
With the xed fee they remain residual claimants on their income. They thus
choose to work less hard than in the situation with a xed tuition fee.
2.4.2 University Moral Hazard
So far we have assumed that teaching quality is exogenous. However, it
is quite likely that universitiese¤orts to improve teaching quality are also
a¤ected by the mode of nancing higher education. We model this by assum-
ing that revenues from the up-front tuition fee and graduate tax are to be
shared equally among the n universities and that each university can a¤ect
the teaching quality provided.
Each university j 2 f1; 2; :::; ng can expend e¤ort to increase its teach-
ing quality qj, investing more in the human-capital formation of its stu-
dents. The (nonmonetary) cost of e¤ort of the university sta¤ is   (qj; sj) =
(=2) sj (qj   q)2, where sj denotes the mass of students educated by uni-
versity j and q represents the basic teaching quality provided voluntarily by
the university, regardless of any external incentives.6 We assume that the
teaching cost parameter  is greater than the workplace cost parameter c,
since  is a per capita measure.7 Universities are risk-neutral. Furthermore,
6For simplicity, we have assumed that the cost of e¤ort in teaching quality is linear in
the number of students. In reality these costs may be concave due to economies of scale.
Note that since we have a continuum of students I = [0; 1] and n universities with an
equal number of students, sj = 1=n 8j.
7It should not be the case that it costs an individual more to generate a wage increase
through higher direct workplace e¤ort than it costs his university to achieve the same
increase indirectly through improved teaching quality.
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we assume for simplicity that the distribution of student abilities is the same
at each university and that universities are of equal size. Finally, we as-
sume that each university is interested in maximizing its budget, taking into
account the e¤ort costs of raising teaching quality.
With a centrally determined up-front fee, the universities have no inu-
ence on revenues through teaching quality. Thus, a university simply seeks
to minimize its cost of e¤ort. It hence chooses qj = q, and the system pro-
vides no additional incentives to raise quality. Under the graduate tax, the
universities choose e¤ort so as to maximize their revenue, net of the cost of
e¤ort. The total revenue from the graduate tax is

Z 1
0
Widi = 
"
nX
l=1
slqlma +
Z 1
0
h
e+ (1  ) ai
c
i
aidi
#
:
The optimization problem of university j is
max
qj
1
n

"
nX
l=1
slqlma +
Z 1
0
h
e+ (1  ) ai
c
i
aidi
#
  
2
sj (qj   q)2 :
The rst-order condition yields
1
n
sjma   sj (qj   q) = 0
, qj = q + ma
n
:
The universities have a stake in providing a better quality of teaching under
the graduate tax, as they will benet from the surplus revenues generated
through increasing the future wages of their students.
Note the classic free-rider problem among universities. As each university
is allocated an equal share of total tax revenue, the marginal revenue from
improved teaching quality is lower, the more universities there are (the higher
is n).
Yet there is a straightforward solution to this problem: universities should
be allowed to collect tax directly from their own alumni. To analyze this
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formally, note that in this case the optimization problem of university j is
max
qj
sjqjma + sj
Z 1
0
h
e+ (1  ) ai
c
i
aidi  
2
sj (qj   q)2 ;
with rst-order condition
sjma   sj (qj   q) = 0
, qj = q = q + ma

8j:
Clearly, the quality provided is higher under the direct collection system
than when the graduate tax is shared equally among the public universities.
Hence, we can conclude:
Proposition 4 When universities set their teaching quality endogenously,
graduate taxes provide better incentives for universities to invest in their
studentshuman capital than do xed tuition fees. These incentives are even
stronger when each university receives the tax revenues directly from its own
former students.
Thus, such a system would make universities stakeholders in the career suc-
cess of their students. Universities that nd e¤ective new ways to increase
their studentshuman capital are able to share the gains.
2.4.3 The Trade-O¤ between Incentives
We see from Propositions 3 and 4 that there is a trade-o¤ when moving
from xed tuition fees to a graduate tax. On the one hand, graduates are
less inclined to expend e¤ort on work as the marginal revenue from e¤ort
decreases while marginal costs remain unchanged. On the other hand, the
prospect of increased future tax revenues induces universities to invest in
the quality of their teaching (which they do not do under the xed tuition
fee). We now analyze the states funding policy, assuming that the states
objective function is to maximize the utility of the median (mean) student,
which is equivalent to the maximization of aggregate utility. We allow for a
combination of both a tuition fee and a graduate tax.
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We again impose a viability condition, ensuring that even without incen-
tives, university graduates are su¢ ciently productive to cover the education
budget decit:
(q + e)ma > K  B:
The time structure of the game is as follows: First the state sets the
funding policy, consisting of a possible combination of xed up-front fees
and a graduate tax rate. The tuition fee is paid, and then universities choose
the teaching quality. Finally, the graduates choose their e¤ort at work, and
universities collect the revenues from the graduate tax.
1 2 3 4 5
-
state up-front universities graduates income;
sets tuition choose choose graduate
funding fee teaching e¤ort taxes
policy is paid quality at work are paid
Figure 2.1: Timeline
Let em be the equilibrium e¤ort exerted by the median student. Note that
the state chooses fee and tax such that universities earn as much as needed to
balance the budget in equilibrium, anticipating the studentsand universities
reaction to the funding policy. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium  and 
are chosen so as to maximize the certainty equivalent of the median student:
(1  ) (q + em)ma     1
2
c (em   e)2   1
2
r (1  )2 2"
subject to the incentive constraints
ei = e+ (1  ) ai
c
for i 2 [0; 1] ;
q = q + 
ma

;
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and the budget-balancing condition, which now becomes
+ 
Z 1
0
(q + ei) aidi = K  B:
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 With both university and graduate moral hazard, the state
chooses a strictly positive graduate tax
 =
cm2a

+ 2a + cr
2
"
m2a + 2
2
a + cr
2
"
:
This tax is decreasing in the universitiescost parameter  and increasing in
the graduatescost parameter c. The state will impose an additional tuition
fee  if and only if the budget decit K B is su¢ ciently large, and otherwise
pay a subsidy.
Proof. The state solves
max
;;e;q
(1  ) (q + em)ma     1
2
c (em   e)2   1
2
r (1  )2 2":
Subsituting the studentsoptimal e¤ort levels, the budget-balancing condi-
tion becomes
 = K  B   
Z 1
0

q + 
ma

+ e+ (1  ) ai
c

aidi
= K  B   

q + 
ma

+ e

ma + (1  )
Z 1
0
a2i
c
di

= K  B   

qma + 
m2a

+ ema + (1  ) 1
c
E

a2i

= K  B   

qma + 
m2a

+ ema + (1  ) 1
c
 
2a +m
2
a

: (2.4)
Substituting , ei, and q into the objective function and simplifying, we
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obtain
max

(1  ) qma +
 
   2 m2a

+ (1  ) ema
+ (1  )2 m
2
a
c
 K +B + qma + 2m
2
a

+ ema
+
 
   2 1
c
 
2a +m
2
a
  1
2
(1  )2 m
2
a
c
  1
2
r (1  )2 2";
which is strictly concave in . The rst-order condition is
  qma + (1  2) m
2
a

  ema   2 (1  ) m
2
a
c
+ qma + 2
m2a

+ ema + (1  2) 1
c
 
2a +m
2
a

+ (1  ) m
2
a
c
+ r (1  )2" = 0:
By solving for  we obtain . Given the budget-balancing condition, the
tuition fee can be computed by inserting  into (2.4). Q.E.D.
Note that  2 (0; 1), since c < . The optimal policy is driven by several
e¤ects. First, the budget decit has to be nanced. In addition, the two
incentive problems have to be taken into account as well as the insurance
e¤ects of the nance policy. The double moral-hazard problem is reected in
the fact that the tax rate is increasing in graduate e¤ort costs c and decreasing
in the university teaching costs . Indeed, in the case where 2a = 
2
" = 0
the graduate tax represents a direct trade-o¤ between the costs of graduate
e¤ort and university teaching as  = c=. The more costly teaching e¤ort
is relative to graduate work e¤ort the lower is the tax rate (as the provision
of incentives for universities has lower returns), and vice versa.
The tax represents insurance for students regarding the unsystematic uc-
tuations in future wages, in that income is redistributed. The higher 2" and
the higher the studentsdegree of risk aversion r, the higher is the tax rate,
as the state takes on this risk to a larger extent. Note that  may well be-
come negative when these insurance considerations outweigh other aspects,
and hence the fee  may become a subsidy.8
8This is for example the case when future income is extremely volatile: 2" ! 1 )
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Finally, it is interesting to consider the comparative statics with respect
to the mean ma and variance 2a of the ability distribution, which are less
obvious than the previous considerations. First, when all abilities are equal
(i.e., 2a = 0), the tax rate is strictly decreasing inma. The higher the average
ability in the population, the higher the revenues of the graduate tax, thus
the lower the tax rate required to nance the education budget decit.
However, the e¤ects of a change in the variance of talent in the population,
2a, are much less straightforward. Such a change has no direct impact on
the median students utility, but it has an indirect one. Note that there is
a basic complementarity between ability and e¤ort in production. Recall
that a graduates wage is (q + ei) ai + "i and the incentive-compatible e¤ort
is ei = e + (1  ) ai=c. Students of higher ability have a higher marginal
return to e¤ort and exert higher levels of e¤ort. Due to this complementarity
the talent-wage relation is convex. By Jensens inequality, for a given ma a
larger variance in the distribution of talents, 2a, leads to higher expected
wages and therefore higher tax revenues for a given . But this does not
necessarily lead to lower graduate taxes. To see this, note that the optimal
tax rate is strictly decreasing in 2a if and only if
m2a

1  2 c


  cr2" < 0
, m
2
a
2m
2
a

+ r2"
< c;
i.e., when c is su¢ ciently large. For such high graduate e¤ort costs, the
optimal tax rate is rather large. At this level, the disincentive e¤ect of an
increase in the tax is relatively high, leading to a decrease in tax revenue
(we are beyond the highest point of the so-called La¤er curve). Should 2a
increase, more income is generated on account of Jensens inequality. The
tax rate should however be lowered in order to generate higher revenues and
hence lower tuition fees. The reverse is true when graduate e¤ort costs are
low c < m2a= (2m
2
a= + r
2
"). In this case, the optimal tax rate is small and
 ! 1)  < 0. Educational subsidies as a means for redistribution are discussed by Dur
et al. (2004).
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the disincentive e¤ect of an increase in the tax is relatively small. A rise in
the spread of abilities may be met with an increase in the tax rate, as tax
revenues will then be driven up by the highly able. The median student then
benets from lower tuition fees.
2.5 Decision to Study at University
In the previous sections students account for the whole population. In this
section we relax this assumption, allowing for only a subset of the population
to study and focusing on the decision of a school-leaver to apply for a place
at university. We compare the graduate tax with up-front tuition fees and
determine which system leads to a higher number of applications, focusing
on the selection problem.
Let there be a continuum of school-leavers I = [0; 1] contemplating whether
or not to take a degree course at university. School-leaver i is aware of his
or her ability ai, and abilities are normally distributed: ai  N (ma; 2a). For
simplicity, all school-leavers who decide against a university degree will attain
a certainty equivalent of w0, irrespective of their abilities. But if school-leaver
i decides to study, the second-period graduate wage is
Wi = qai + "i;
where q again stands for the quality of education and "i  N (0; 2") represents
a random component of future income of a university graduate unbeknown
to the school-leaver at the time of applying for a place at university.9 We
again assume that "i and ai are uncorrelated. Suppose now that the per
capita costs of education are equal to . Furthermore, we assume that the
state can screen the applicants and can set a minimum ability level amin as
a precondition for admission.
9To reduce the complexity of analysis, we revert to exogenous teaching quality and the
basic-model wage that is independent of workplace e¤ort.
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With a tuition fee , a school-leaver will apply for university if
E [qai + "i   ]  1
2
r  var [qai + "i   ] > w0
, qai     1
2
r2" > w0
, ai >
w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
q
.
With a graduate tax , a university education is chosen if
E [(1  ) (qai + "i)]  1
2
r  var [(1  ) (qai + "i)] > w0
, (1  ) qai   1
2
r (1  )2 2" > w0
, ai >
w0 +
1
2
r (1  )2 2"
(1  ) q . (2.5)
In the case of a xed tuition fee, the state can cover its costs by setting
 = , regardless of the number of students. With the tax rate, however,
voluntary enrolment will not necessarily lead to a balanced budget when the
tax rate is small. But the state can always limit enrolment by imposing an
appropriate minimum ability requirement.
We now show that more school-leavers will apply for university if the state
implements a budget-balancing graduate tax. To see this, we rst consider
a situation in which the state imposes a xed fee  =  on all students. In
this case, the marginal student, i.e., the one whose ability is just su¢ cient to
warrant a university education rather than employment directly on nishing
school, is characterized by ability
a =
w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
q
.
Now suppose instead that the state sets a graduate tax rate 0 leading to
exactly the same expected payment by the marginal student as the budget
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balacing fee, i.e.,
0qa =  , 0 = 
qa
=

w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
.
By substituting this tax level into (2.5) we see that a school-leaver will choose
to enrol if
ai >
w0 +
1
2
r

1  
w0+
1
2
r2"+
2
2"
1  
w0+
1
2
r2"+

q
=: a.
Note that a is always smaller than a, as
w0 +
1
2
r

1  
w0+
1
2
r2"+
2
2"
1  
w0+
1
2
r2"+

q
<
w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
q
,

1  
w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
2
< 1;
which is always true. Hence, the number of applicants will increase when
moving to a graduate tax and imposing this tax rate.
Now we consider the e¤ect of the tax on the states nances. Recall that
by denition, the state always breaks even with the budget-balancing xed
fee. With the tax, the state earns less when students of lower ability choose to
enrol. However, costs can be controlled by limiting enrolment and choosing
a threshold ability for admission amin 2 [a; a]. The expected surplus from
the tax is then Z 1
amin
(0qai   ) f (ai) dai
=
Z 1
amin


ai
a
  1

f (ai) dai
=
Z 1
a


ai
a
  1

f (ai) dai +
Z a
amin


ai
a
  1

f (ai) dai: (2.6)
Note that the rst term of expression (2.6) is strictly positive. This is due
to the fact that with the tax the state collects more money than it spends
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from all the students who would rather enrol with the fee; although these
students would prefer the fee, they continue to enrol with the tax. On the
other hand, at the tax rate 0, the state subsidizes those students with ability
levels below a. Still, it is always possible to nance such a subsidy out of
the additional revenues collected from the more able students. The state
simply sets a minimum ability requirement amin that guarantees that it does
not lose money from implementing the graduate tax. The budget-balancing
threshold amin is strictly smaller than a. To see this, note that the budget
surplus (2.6) is strictly positive at amin = a and decreases as the admission
threshold amin is lowered.
Hence, we conclude:
Proposition 6 By replacing a budget-balancing tuition fee with a graduate
tax, enrolment can be increased without violating the budget constraint.
There are two reasons for this property of the graduate tax. The rst is risk
aversion; the tax reduces the risk of uncertain returns from studying and in
turn increases the school-leavers willingness to study. This can be seen by
comparing the certainty equivalent of the marginal student paying the tax
with the alternative certainty equivalent when paying the fee; the former is
always higher than the latter:
E [(1  ) (qa + ")]  1
2
r  var [(1  ) (qa + ")]
> E [qa + "   ]  1
2
r  var [qa + "   ]
,

1  
qa

qa   1
2
r

1  
qa
2
2" > qa    
1
2
r2"
,

1  
w0 +
1
2
r2" + 
2
< 1.
The second reason for more school-leavers applying with the graduate tax
than the xed tuition fee is price discrimination. The tax results in higher
prices for those students with a higher willingness to pay, due to their higher
abilities, and lower prices for others, who are less able with a lower willingness
to pay.
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Of course, it is important to stress that increasing enrolment may not be
an appropriate goal in its own right, as this could result in overprovision of
university education. It is therefore instructive to compare enrolment under
both systems with a rst-best benchmark. Note that if the risk-neutral state
could absorb all the risk, in the rst-best solution any individual for which
qai > w0 +  should enrol. Hence, there is a cuto¤
aFB =
w0 + 
q
characterizing the ability of the marginal student who should study at uni-
versity in a world with perfect insurance against income uctuations. Note
that a > aFB, so in fact a budget-balancing fee leads to underprovision
of university education relative to this criterion.10 This is because the risk-
averse individuals dislike uncertainty about future income. But as we have
shown in the above, a graduate tax can always increase enrolment without
violating the budget constraint and, hence, it follows directly that setting
an appropriate tax rate rather than charging a budget-balancing fee would
bring enrolment closer to the rst-best benchmark.
Finally, note that the states nancial contribution to education is as-
sumed to be constant in the model. In reality, the states budget is a func-
tion of revenues from other sources including general income tax, which also
depends on productivity and is a¤ected by education levels.11 In our model,
the graduate tax attracts a greater number of students without deterring
high-ability students from enrolling. Since all graduates are more productive
than they would have been without a university education, we conjecture
that a graduate tax would provide a greater return on investment to the
states part-nancing of education, in terms of general income tax revenues,
than would xed tuition fees.
10Note too that the higher the quality of teaching q, the higher the optimal level of
enrolment (the lower is aFB).
11Note that this may be a rationale for the state to choose a strictly positive B to
subsidize university education from the general budget.
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2.6 Conclusion and Outlook
We have compared xed tuition fees with a graduate tax as a means to
fund higher education, from the perspective of students of di¤ering ability.
Applying a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion, we were able
to show that for risk-averse students, a graduate tax is generally preferable,
as it insures against uctuations in future income. We then allowed for
universities to invest in teaching quality and for income to depend not only
on this quality but also on graduate e¤ort at the workplace. We showed that
while the tax is a disincentive for workers to generate income themselves, it
acts as an incentive for the universities to improve the quality of education.
A key nding is that the tax is most e¤ective when paid directly by graduates
to their former universities. In this way, it is possible to overcome the free-
rider problem which exists when the state shares tax revenue equally among
universities.
One may ask what the e¤ect would be of having tuition fees collected
directly by universities. In our model, there are only two periods and the
fee is paid only once; thus there would be no direct incentive for universities
to increase teaching quality. Were the model extended to more periods or
an overlapping-generations setup, long-term reputation considerations would
become relevant and implicit incentives would be created. However, reputa-
tion would always be built on past teaching quality; the incentives would not
be as immediate as those created by the graduate tax scheme.
Although our students di¤er in their innate abilities, we do not di¤eren-
tiate between rich and poor students and do not look into grants and loans.
Hence, the issue of equity based on initial endowments of wealth does not
arise in the model. This might be incorporated via an interest rate that
varies between students with respect to their ability to borrow money to
pay the up-front fee. Note that if we did distinguish between rich and poor,
the level of risk aversion could be lower among wealthier individuals, and an
assumption of decreasing rather than constant risk aversion might be more
appropriate. The advantage of the tax in reducing the risk in future income
would then be greater for potential students from poorer backgrounds. Tu-
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ition fees would represent a stronger deterrent to poorer individuals in the
decision to enrol at university. Despite not considering di¤erent levels of
wealth, when we endogenize the decision by school-leavers whether or not
to apply for university, our analysis does demonstrate that a graduate tax
would allow a larger proportion of the population to study than the equiva-
lent up-front tuition fee. This is due to the tax exacting price discrimination
on the market for higher education in addition to its insurance properties.
Individual risk concerns under a system of tuition fees lead to underprovision
of university education, and a graduate tax could be used to bring enrolment
closer to the optimal level.
Barr (2004) advocates a system of loans with income-contingent repay-
ments, which has similar properties to the graduate tax but is beyond the
scope of our analysis. Such systems operate in Australia and Sweden.12 They
have the attraction of allowing students to reap more of the returns from ed-
ucation and mitigate disincentive e¤ects on e¤ort at the workplace relative
to a graduate tax. However there is no direct cross-subsidy from high-ability
students to nance the education of those with lower abilities, and there is
less transfer of risk where the principal of a loan remains payable, so par-
ticipation in higher education is likely to be lower with income-contingent
repayments than with a graduate tax. The problem of moral hazard with
regard to university investments in teaching quality may also persist with
income-contingent loans, as revenues from graduates are limited to covering
the cost of their education, as is the case with the xed tuition fees in our
model.
Finally, alumni donations seem to play an increasingly signicant role in
nancing higher education.13 A graduate tax might be expected to crowd out
donations more than would up-front tuition fees. Yet Rothstein and Rouse
(2011) nd that students who nanced their studies through loans were no
12Using data on graduate income proles, Chapman and Sinning (2012) demonstrate
how a system of income-contingent loans could be introduced to compensate for a signi-
cant rise in tuition fees at universities in Germany.
13This is especially true in the USA. From a nationwide sample of 415 institutions
of higher education, Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) calculate an average annual
donation of U.S. $149 per alumnus.
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less likely to pledge a gift to their institution than those who studied on
a free grant. Alumni bearing debt from their studies were, however, more
likely to default on such pledges, an e¤ect that the authors attribute to credit
constraints. Voluntary contributions to ones alma mater presumably arise
through graduate preferences for fairness and reciprocity. An interesting
extension to our model may thus be to consider the e¤ect of universities
anticipating such preferences on their incentives to improve teaching quality.
29
Chapter 3
Tax or Beg? Mandatory
Payments to Charity and their
E¤ects on Donor Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Charitable organizationsincome derives from various sources. On the one
hand, individuals and private foundations provide voluntary donations. On
the other hand, funds are provided indirectly through state grants. It is
perhaps natural to wonder why the state is required to nance these organi-
zations when it is people who vote for government in the rst place and pay
for its spending via their taxes. To what extent do charities benet from such
government intermediation? In several European countries, a small charity
tax forms an integral part of standard scal policy.1 The purpose of the
present study is to ask whether such mandatory payments to charity lead to
higher contributions than would do a system of purely voluntary donations.
Put shortly, should we let government tax or charities beg?
In practice, we observe further scal intervention related to donations.
In Germany, for example, donors may reclaim tax paid on the income they
1In Germany, Finland and Sweden, the state levies additional tax from church members.
In Italy and Spain, there exist similar regimes but taxpayers can opt for their money to
be spent on nonreligious causes. Charity tax rates range from 0.8% to 2.5% of income.
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have donated to registered charities. In the United Kingdom, the Gift Aid
scheme allows charities themselves to reclaim tax paid on the income donated
to them by taxpayers.2 Andreoni (1990) o¤ers a rational explanation for
the existence of such scal incentives for donors. Assuming people derive
additional utility from the act of donating voluntarily (they experience the
warm glowof giving), charity revenues will be higher through subsidies to
voluntary donations than via the equivalent compulsory charity tax.
Our study involves a laboratory experiment that compares a system of
voluntary donations with a compulsory charity tax at various rates. We set no
explicit incentives to donate. Indeed, in the absence of subsidies, Andreoni
(1990) would not predict any di¤erence in total contributions (voluntary
donations plus charity-tax revenue) between the systems for pure altruists
as long as the tax does not exceed their desired level of contributions. The
tax would merely crowd out the voluntary part of contributions. For impure
altruists who experience warm glow, the introduction of a tax should only
increase total contributions as they are unwilling to substitute all of their
voluntary donations with the tax. They would continue to donate on top of
the tax in order to continue experiencing warm glow.
We are not the rst to investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent scal systems on
the propensity to donate within an experimental setting. Andreoni (1993)
himself found that taxing contributions to the public good crowded out vol-
untary contributions incompletely, by less than three quarters. Bolton and
Katok (1998) used a dictator game to elicit donor preferences which also
turned out to be in accordance with warm glow theory. However, their study
focused on altruism between experiment participants rather than on dona-
tions to charitable organizations. Researchers in the eld of neuroscience
have been concerned with motives for charitable giving. Harbaugh et al.
(2007) report larger activation in reward-related areas [of the brain] when
executing a charitable transfer, over and above what occurs in an analogous
mandatory transfer, even after controlling for the payo¤s associated with
2Higher-rate taxpayers can reclaim the di¤erence between the higher and basic rates
of tax. See Heinzel (2004) for some further examples of European tax-relief systems with
regard to charitable spending.
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subject choices.Although our results gain some plausibility in light of this
study, it is based on observations of just nineteen subjects.3
Our experiment is most closely related to Eckel et al. (2005). They com-
pare donations when donors are taxed at two di¤erent, positive tax rates,
across two frames, one where the tax is called as such, and the other where
it is masked as a contribution to the charity from the experimenter, as a
model of scal illusion. Subjectsvoluntary donations are crowded out by
the higher tax in the transparent setting but not when the frame is opaque 
hence the subjects are successfully illuded. Our design sets itself aside from
Eckel et al. (2005) in three key ways. First and foremost, it is not about
scal illusion. Our no-tax treatment is just that; there really is no tax. In
the tax treatments, the charity tax is always labeled as such in order to
preclude framing e¤ects. Second, we make our subjects work for the money
from which they can donate rather than simply paying them for turning up.4
Indeed, 12.5% of our subjects fail to complete a su¢ cient number of tasks
satisfactorily and are consequently unable to donate. Third, we choose dif-
ferent tax rates, setting them to 2%, 8% and 30%, rather than replicating
the rates of 10% and 25% in the above-mentioned experiments. The aim here
is to see if particularly small or large tax rates make a di¤erence. In their ex-
periment on work incentives, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) report that while
e¤ort is positively related to the level of the reward, the very introduction
of monetary compensation has a negative e¤ect on performance. Similarly,
we hypothesize that introducing a small charity tax actually decreases total
charity revenue as people react adversely to being constrained to contribute
a minimum amount to the charity. Indeed, on average, voluntary donations
under our small tax are crowded out by more than one hundred percent.5
Only higher tax rates, while also crowding out voluntary donations, guaran-
tee charity revenues to reach those achieved under the tax-free system.
3A potential weakness in the design by Harbaugh et al. (2007) is that they did not
implement separate tax/no-tax treatments. Subjects switched between mandatory and
voluntary transfers, which presumably made the aim of the experimenters quite obvious
to them. In addition, there was no free choice on the actual amount to be donated.
4This represents a more general departure from typical designs of experiments on char-
itable giving.
5This result holds exclusively for male participants.
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The chapter is structured as follows. We begin with a simple model
to analyze the economic-theoretical impact of changes in the tax rate on
contributions to the cause. We next distinguish between high and low taxes,
deriving a counter-hypothesis from psychology. We then consider gender
e¤ects based on previous ndings in the literature. In section 3.3 we introduce
our experimental design and in section 3.4 we present and discuss our results,
before concluding and proposing an extension to our experimental design in
section 3.5.
3.2 Theoretical Basis
3.2.1 A Simple Economic Model
We rst present a simple economic model and show that a donor who cares
about a good cause is indi¤erent between whether money destined for the
cause is transferred via a tax on income or through a voluntary donation.6
We assume that an exogenously determined level of income w > 0 is earned
and that a lump-sum tax t 2 [0; w] is levied on this income. The tax revenue
goes to a good cause. On top of this, the donor may make a voluntary
donation v to the same good cause. The total contribution to the cause is
thus c = v+ t. The donor derives positive utility from personal consumption
of net income x and from her total contribution to the cause c. The donors
utility function is concave in both parameters: U (x; c) ; Ux  0; Uxx < 0 and
Uc  0; Ucc < 0. In addition, her marginal utility from personal consumption
is positive at the point of no consumption Ux (0; ) > 0.
Under the charity tax, the donor decides on the voluntary donation that
6The model is similar to Andreoni (1990) where individuals are considered to derive
extra utility from the act of giving voluntarily. He refers to warm glowand labels such
donors impure altruists. However, in our model we only allow for pure altruism. It is
also di¤erent in that utility is based simply on contributions from a donor to her chosen
good cause. We assume that she has no information about transfers from other donors to
this cause and that their contributions to the public good do not a¤ect her utility.
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maximizes utility subject to her budget constraint,
max
v
U (x; c)
s.t. v  0
x+ c = w.
Substituting c = v + t, we have
max
v
U (w   v   t; v + t)
s.t. v  0.
We now distinguish between two cases. In the rst case, marginal utility
from voluntary donations at the point of zero voluntary donations is less
than or equal to marginal utility from personal consumption. This could be
either because the donor is selsh in not wanting to contribute anything to
the cause or because the charity tax at this point is already equal to or above
the amount the donor would optimally allocate to the cause. We then obtain
the corner solution with an optimal voluntary donation of zero v = 0. In
the second case, where marginal utility from voluntary donations at the point
of zero voluntary donations is positive, we have an interior solution v > 0
characterized by the rst-order condition7
dU
dv
= 0
,  Ux + Uc = 0. (3.1)
We thus state our rst theoretical result.
7See subsection 3.6.1 for the proof.
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Proposition 1 For Ux (w   t; t) < Uc (w   t; t), donors give v > 0 volun-
tarily at the point where marginal utility from consumption equals marginal
utility from total charitable contributions Ux = Uc. Otherwise they donate
nothing v = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dv
dt
=  1. (3.2)
Voluntary donations and mandatory tax contributions are thus perfect sub-
stitutes for each other. We now examine what happens when the tax level is
changed,
c = v (t) + t
) dc
dt
=  1 + 1 = 0.
Our second theoretical result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Given a positive optimal voluntary donation v > 0, any
small change in the charity tax will be o¤set by an adjustment in the voluntary
donation such that total contributions remain una¤ected dc
dt
= 0.
Changing the tax level will not inuence total revenue to the good cause
as the donor adjusts her voluntary donation accordingly. At the point where
the voluntary donation has been totally crowded out by the tax we again
obtain the corner solution v = 0 and any further increase in the tax will
enforce a level of contributions which is suboptimal for the donor. None of
these shall then be voluntary. Based on the assumptions of this economic
model, it may be inferred that a charity-tax system would be superior to a
system of purely voluntary donations, in terms of total contributions. We
hence present our rst hypothesis to be tested in the experiment.
Hypothesis 1 (economics)
A compulsory charity tax generates total contributions from donors equal
to or above those generated by a system of voluntary donations.
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3.2.2 Psychological Reactance Theory
In this subsection, we adopt an alternative approach from psychology to ar-
gue that our rst hypothesis should only hold for a su¢ ciently large charity
tax. In his theory of psychological reactance,Brehm (1966) supposes that
individuals enjoy specic freedoms regarding how to behave and suggests
that if such a freedom comes under threat, a desire to reinstate the free-
dom is experienced. Examples of observed behavior in line with this theory
range from children who refuse to eat vegetables when forced but readily
do so when vegetables are presented to them as a delicacy available only to
adults, to politicians who deliberately change their course of action solely
to demonstrate that they are fully capable of making their own decisions.8
Applying psychological reactance theory to our comparison of a compulsory
charity tax with a system of voluntary donations, we derive predictions that
conict with the economic reasoning in subsection 3.2.1. Given the choice,
individuals would prefer not to be forced to support a cause through a tax.
Where voluntary donations are still possible in combination with the char-
ity tax, donors may use these to demonstrate their frustration with the tax.
Deeming themselves capable of deciding how to allocate their own income,
they will react adversely to the tax by reducing the total contributions made
to the cause through lower voluntary donations. When the tax rate is su¢ -
ciently low, i.e. the forced contribution is less than what the individual would
contribute within a purely voluntary system, the introduction of this tax may
hence lead to lower total contributions. We therefore hypothesize that small
charity taxes crowd out voluntary donations by more than one hundred per-
cent. Only when the charity tax is su¢ ciently large does it generate higher
total contributions than a system of purely voluntary donations.
Hypothesis 2 (psychology)
(a) A small compulsory charity tax generates lower total contributions from
donors than a system of voluntary donations.
8See Brehm and Brehm (1981) for further examples.
36
(b) A large compulsory charity tax generates higher total contributions
from donors than a system of voluntary donations.
3.2.3 Gender Aspects
Previous research on charitable giving has shown that men and women often
di¤er in their generosity. There is mixed evidence in the economics literature
on giving regarding di¤erences between the sexes.9 In the context of dictator
games such as in our experiment, Bolton and Katok (1995) nd no gender
di¤erence whereas Eckel and Grossman (1998) report giving by female sub-
jects to be double that of their male counterparts. Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001) obtain a more complex result whereby whether male or female donors
are more generous depends on the price of giving (men are more responsive
to changes in price). Kamas et al. (2008) nd that in anonymous individual
giving to charity, women donate more than men, but when women are able
to negotiate the amount to be donated with men, the latter increase their
donations.10 We base our third hypothesis on the sum of these ndings, i.e.
if there is a general trend, it is that women tend to be more generous than
men.
Hypothesis 3 (gender)
On average, female participants donate more than male participants.
Having established our hypotheses, we next present the design of the
experiment.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment was programmed and implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) version 3.2.6 and is subdivided into four treatments. The rst of these
9See Cox and Deck (2006) for a comprehensive overview.
10Negotiation may not always lead to increased charitable giving. Using US survey data
on the donor behavior of married couples, Andreoni et al. (2003) nd that those who
bargain give signicantly less compared to situations in which decisions are made by a
single spouse.
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is the no-tax treatment while in the remaining three a charity tax on income
is levied at 2%, 8% and 30%, respectively.
120 individuals, mostly students on various courses at the University of
Cologne, Germany, were recruited to four experimental sessions, two in June
2007 and two in October 2007 at the Cologne Laboratory11 using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004).12 Each participant was allocated a computer booth ran-
domly upon arrival at the laboratory. Once all the participants were seated,
the experimenter thanked them for coming and informed them that they
would be working for money and that they would be able to donate a part
of their earnings to a good cause. They were also told not to communicate
with fellow participants. The rest of the instructions appeared on the com-
puter screens as they varied by treatment and all four treatments took place
simultaneously in each session in order to control for any session e¤ects that
might arise.13
In each treatment, subjects were provided with the descriptions of six
charities in print form and were rst instructed to read them.14 They were
then required to select one of the charities to which they would be able to
11The Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. For more information, see
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/rs/public/index.php?language=en.
12This system provides for the selection of potential participants according to various
criteria such as age, gender, university course, etc. The only two restrictions imposed on
the invitations to this experiment were (a) that the invitees had not previously applied
for participation in other experiments and then not shown up and (b) that they had not
previously participated in experiments with the same real-e¤ort task. There was no men-
tion of charity or the opportunity to donate in the invitations. In all, 140 individuals were
invited (35 per session); those turning up rst were allowed to participate and the remain-
der (up to 5 people per session) were denied participation and paid e2.50 for showing up.
This is standard procedure in Cologne in order to ensure punctuality and avoid empty
seats for no-shows. The demographics of those who actually participated are presented in
subsection 3.6.2.
13Translations of the instructions can be found in subsection 3.6.3. Since there were
thirty participants per session and thirty is not divisible by four, sessions alternated be-
tween treatment formations of 8-8-7-7 and 7-7-8-8. That is, in two sessions, eight partici-
pants were allocated to the no-tax treatment, eight to the 2% treatment and seven to each
of the 8% and 30% treatments. In the other two sessions, this pattern was reversed.
14Eckel et al. (2005) also had their subjects pick a charity from a list. Our charities
were preselected from participating organizations at the Cologne Volunteer Day (Kölner
Ehrenamtstag) held on 24 September 2006. They range in scope from local to interna-
tional, covering areas from health to the environment (see gure 3.1). None of them has
an overtly religious background.
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donate any money they earned in the experiment. After having selected a
charity, they were informed of the tasks they should perform in order to
earn the xed amount of e10 on top of the show-up fee of e2.50. These
tasks involved adding or subtracting the sums of the digits in two twelve-
gure numbers, depending on their relative size. A minimum of ve correct
answers over a period of fteen minutes was required to earn the e10. Two
simple examples were displayed on the screen and the subjects were provided
with pens and paper to assist them in their calculations.15 Before the fteen-
minute period of work began, subjects were informed of their respective scal
settings and the possibility to donate from their after-tax income. Those
in the no-tax treatment were simply told that they would earn e10 upon
fullling the minimum requirement and that they would be able to donate
any amount from this to their designated charity at the end of the fteen-
minute period. Those in the treatments with 2%, 8% and 30% tax rates were
informed that they would earn e10 upon fullling the minimum requirement
and that e0.20, e0.80 and e3, respectively, would be levied as a tax from
this income and paid to the charity of their choice.16 In addition, they would
then be able to donate any amount from the remainder (e9.80, e9.20 and
e7, respectively) to their designated charity at the end of the fteen-minute
period.17 Once all the participants had clicked a button to acknowledge
that they had understood the instructions, the fteen-minute period started
simultaneously for all treatments.
At the end of the fteen minutes, the subjects were informed of their
earnings. Unsuccessful participants were told that they had unfortunately
failed to achieve the minimum number of ve correct answers, informed that
they would be paid e2.50 and asked to remain seated to ll in a questionnaire
at the computer. Successful subjects were told that they had achieved the
minimum of ve correct answers and informed of their gross earnings and
15The use of calculators was not permitted.
16The designated charities were named at this stage to reassure the subjects that their
choice of organization had been registered.
17In compliance with laboratory regulations, all subjects were informed that they would
be paid an additional e2.50 for showing up to the experiment, regardless of their perfor-
mance in the fteen-minute period, but that they would not be able to donate from this
amount within the framework of the experiment.
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Figure 3.1: Experimental Design
any charity-tax deduction. They were then asked to choose how much to
donate on top of this by entering an amount between e0 and their post-tax
income. After having made their choice, they were presented with a table
outlining their earnings, tax contribution and voluntary donation as well as
the show-up fee of e2.50 and the amount they would be paid in cash. They
were also asked to remain seated to ll in a questionnaire.
The questionnaire appeared on the screens once all successful subjects
had decided how much to donate. It contained both general questions on
personal characteristics as well as specic questions tailored to the actual
performance of and decisions made by the individual participants over the
course of the experiment. Once this had been completed, subjects were
called up individually by booth number to collect their cash and, insofar
as tax had been levied and/or money had been donated, a form signed by
the experimenter conrming the name of the charity and the amount (tax
plus donation) to be donated to the charity. Donations were then pooled by
charity and paid by bank transfer to the respective charities in two payment
stages, one after the two sessions in June and the other after the two sessions
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in October.
3.4 Experimental Results
3.4.1 General Results
Of the 120 participants, 105 managed to achieve the minimum number of ve
correct answers and earn the e10 from which to donate. While this leaves us
with a reduced total number of observations of (potential) donors, it is also
an indication that subjects actually had to work for their money. However,
imposing a charity tax did not a¤ect their e¤ort.18 Figure 3.2 shows the
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Figure 3.2: Mean Contribution by Tax Rate
mean average contributions.
18Taxes can act both as incentives and disincentives to work through income and sub-
stitution e¤ects, see e.g. Break (1957). No single e¤ect prevailed in our case of a charity
tax where revenue is destined for a cause of ones choosing. Neither the number of actual
failures nor the task success rate (number of correct answers divided by number of tasks
attempted) di¤ered signicantly between the treatments, see subsection 3.6.7 for details.
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Figure 3.3: Box Plot of Contribution by Tax Rate
At rst glance, it would seem that the economic model does not do too
badly in predicting total contributions across the no-tax and low-tax (2%
and 8% tax) treatments as mean contributions are comparable.19 It does not
predict the donations on top of the 30% tax, although there is at least some
crowding out of donations here.20 The 30% tax does generate signicantly
higher total contributions than the no-tax treatment.21 Overall, we may be
tempted to accept hypothesis 1, and we can certainly provide evidence to
support hypothesis 2(b).
However, these aggregated data do mask existing di¤erences between the
treatments that appear on closer inspection of the respective distributions
of donations in the data. Figure 3.3 displays the range of contributions by
treatment. The dotted lines represent the median contributions while the
19Nonparametric comparisons of total contributions in the 2% and 8% tax treatments
with those in the no-tax treatment reveal no signicant di¤erence. See subsection 3.6.4
for details of the nonparametric tests.
20Note that the fact that we still nd positive donations with the 30% tax is in line with
warm glow theory (Andreoni, 1990).
21A Fligner-Policello test comparison of both treatments results in a probability of error
of less than 0.1%.
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boxes include all values between the 25th and 75th percentiles. Whiskers
mark the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively, and the small circles depict
outliers. First, note that the distributions of contributions in the tax treat-
ments are compressed relative to the distribution in the no-tax treatment.
Indeed, we would expect this from the economic theory in subsection 3.2.1 as
total contributions are limited at the bottom by the tax itself while crowding
out pulls the distribution downwards. Yet in relative terms, there are more
cases of zero voluntary donations in the no-tax treatment, which contains 24
observations, than in either of the 2% or 8% tax treatments, which contain
26 and 27 observations, respectively. There, the 25th percentile is at the
higher level of e1 rather than the lower bounds of e0.20 and e0.80. This is
in part due to preferences for round numbers among those toward the lower
end of the distribution.22
Note that the median contribution in the 2% tax treatment at e1 is a
whole euro lower than in the no-tax treatment. Although this di¤erence is not
statistically signicant,23 it is still worthy of mention. Neither the economic
model presented in subsection 3.2.1 nor warm glow theory (Andreoni, 1990)
can explain it. Rather, it represents support for hypothesis 2(a) derived from
the psychological theory in subsection 3.2.2.24 Given that we have drawn
participants from the same distribution (they were recruited from the same
subject pool and allocated randomly to the treatments), what we observe
is crowding out of voluntary donations by the 2% compulsory tax of well
over 100%. In the following subsections we stratify the data by gender to
reveal a signicant di¤erence between male and female donor behavior by
tax treatment and analyze this over-crowding out in some more detail.
22Reasons for the actual amounts donated were solicited from participants donating
positive amounts via an open question in the questionnaire. If anything related to round
numbers formed part of the answer, a dummy variable roundnum was set to one. While
there were no reports from those donating amounts less than or equal to e1 in the no-tax
treatment, between 35% and 45% of those donating similar small amounts in the 2% and
8% tax treatments did report such preferences.
23A test for a higher median contribution in the no-tax treatment relative to the 2% tax
treatment reveals a probability of error of 13% (one-tailed test).
24See subsection 3.6.5 for comments made by participants that are in line with this
theory.
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3.4.2 Results by Gender
In our experiment, similarly to some of those discussed in subsection 3.2.3, we
nd no signicant di¤erence between male and female giving at the aggregate
level, meaning we cannot reject the null of hypothesis 3. Mean voluntary
donations are e1.34 and e1.26, respectively, with female subjects displaying
higher variance in their donor behavior. However when we look at the gures
by tax treatment, the story changes somewhat. Figure 3.4 shows the mean
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Figure 3.4: Mean Contribution by Tax Rate and Gender
average contributions by gender. While donations in the 2% and 8% tax
treatments do not di¤er much between the sexes, di¤erences are apparent in
the no-tax and 30% tax treatments. Indeed, it would appear that a charity
tax even tends to crowd in donations by female participants. As may be seen
in the box plot in gure 3.5, the higher mean donation by female subjects in
the 30% tax treatment shown in gure 3.4 is driven mainly by outliers (two
generous undergraduate female participants donated fully e7 on top of their
e3 tax).
The most important gender di¤erence is found in the no-tax treatment.
Male participants here donate an average of e2.09, which is more than double
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Figure 3.5: Box Plot of Contribution by Tax Rate and Gender
the mean female donation of e0.90. This di¤erence contradicts hypothesis 3
and is statistically signicant at the 5% level.25 Why should we observe this
stark contrast between the sexes?
We return to the psychological theory presented in subsection 3.2.2, which
already explains why there can be more than 100% crowding out of voluntary
donations when comparing the no-tax to the 2% tax treatment. In further
work on psychological reactance, Regan and Brehm (1972) report di¤erences
between male and female reactance in an experiment on shopping for bread.
They found that while men were susceptible to persuasive messages to buy
a particular brand, women reacted to such messages by deliberately buying
the other brand, despite being shown to be indi¤erent between the brands in
the control group. It is proposed that when people di¤er in the perception of
their competence to exercise a particular freedom, they react di¤erently to
threats to this freedom. The blunt conclusion from the shopping experiment
is that the women there felt more competent than the men in choosing which
25See table 3.15 in subsection 3.6.4 for a Fligner-Policello test of higher contributions
from males than from females in the no-tax treatment. The null hypothesis of equal
contributions from males is rejected (p = 0:013).
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bread to buy. Applying psychological reactance theory in an attempt to ex-
plain our experimental results, it could be that gender a¤ects reactions to
the constraint of having to give at least some money to the charity and not
being free to decide how to spend all of ones money oneself. If women are
more resolved or perceive more of a duty to donate to charity than men, they
are perhaps less likely to be put o¤ by the constraint. They may however
react more than men to anything that appears to demean the value of their
voluntary gift. In an experiment on blood donations, Mellström and Johan-
nesson (2008) investigated the e¤ect of introducing a monetary incentive on
the intention to donate. While the payment had no e¤ect on male intentions,
female participants were signicantly less inclined to make a blood donation
for money. When o¤ered the choice between taking the money for themselves
and transferring it to a charity, female intentions were reinstated to the levels
of those female participants not receiving any monetary incentive. It would
seem that gender e¤ects depend very much on context and that it is di¢ -
cult to generalize our results to anything other than forced versus voluntary
contributions of money to charity.
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3.4.3 Regression Analysis
In the previous subsections we have tested each of our hypotheses in isolation
using nonparametric methods, simply considering whether there is any dif-
ference in total contributions between the treatments and by gender. Here,
we investigate the e¤ects of the charity tax on crowding in/out voluntary
donations in greater detail, testing all our hypotheses simultaneously, with
particular attention to gender di¤erences.26 The variable that we now seek
to explain in the analysis is the voluntary donation rather than the total
contribution.
Using linear regression, we wish to calculate an overall rate of crowding
out and predict what might happen to donor behavior for all feasible tax
rates within the range of 0% to 30%, based on our data for 0%, 2%, 8% and
30% tax rates. We are particularly interested in estimating the level of tax at
which donations would hit zero, so that total contributions at and beyond this
tax level would simply consist of the tax. We might think of this tax level as
the amount that the average (male) participant is willing to pay for charitable
causes. We rst perform ordinary least squares regression (OLS) on the
data. However, this method underestimates crowding out as it does not
take into account the fact that donations cannot be negative. To overcome
this problem, we run a Tobit regression that censors the observations at
both maximum and minimum donations. In doing so, we obtain a more
realistic estimate of crowding out, e¤ectively allowing for the fact that some
participants would have preferred to give less than the e3.00 charity tax
imposed on them. The results from these regressions are presented in table
3.1. Note that when we do not control for gender, we nd no signicant e¤ect
of tax on donations between the tax and no-tax treatments, underlining our
results from the nonparametric tests discussed in subsection 3.4.1.27 The tax
coe¢ cients in table 3.1 represent estimates for dv
dt
from our economic model,
equation (3.2). Both the OLS and the Tobit estimates with absolute values
26We also control for any e¤ects that the choice of a particular charity had on the amount
donated.
27We present robust standard errors here on account of the observed heteroscedasticity
in gure 3.5.
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of less than one indicate that overall the tax only incompletely crowds out
male donations.
Table 3.1: Donations as a Function of the Charity Tax
OLS Tobit(3)
donation donation donation
tax (euros)  0:12 (0:14)  0:33 (0:14)  0:64 (0:25)
female  0:54 (0:36)  0:76 (0:50)
tax female 0:42 (0:27) 0:67 (0:44)
constant 1:51 (0:26) 1:78 (0:32) 1:64 (0:44)
R2 0:06 0:08 0:03
observations 105 105 105
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(2) All regressions include binary control variables for the individual charities.
(3) Tobit: 31 left-censored, 2 right-censored observations; R2 is pseudo R2 .
(4) *, ** & *** denote statistically signicant di¤erence from zero at the 10%, 5% & 1% levels.
The Tobit regression is also presented graphically alongside the actual
donations in gure 3.6.28 As can be seen here, based on the Tobit estimates,
donations would become zero at a tax level of roughly e2.37. In other words,
the average male participant in our experiment was ready to give about one
quarter of the money he earned to the charity.
While the regressions in table 3.1 are informative in the sense that we
can attempt predictions of what participants may donate under charity tax
rates other than those tested in the experiment, they are also awed because
our data are concentrated toward the lower end of the range (e0.00 to e0.80
tax). We therefore turn to binary controls for each of the treatments and
then interact each of these with gender. This enables us to quantify crowding
in/out of donations by the specic charity tax rates more accurately. The
results from these Tobit regressions are presented in table 3.2. Again, when
28The dots representing actual donations have been jittered in the graphs so as to
disclose multiple cases of the same donation. Predicted donations have been evaluated at
the mean values of the charity binary variables for each gender.
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Figure 3.6: Tobit Donation Predictions by Tax and Gender
we do not control for gender, we nd no signicant di¤erence in donations
between the tax and no-tax treatments. However, when the sample is strat-
ied by gender, a clearer picture emerges. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient
estimate for 2% tax relative to the level of tax points to signicant crowding
out of donations by the 2% charity tax. Indeed, the model predicts a dona-
tion of e1.85 for an average male in the no-tax treatment and a donation
of e1.05 for his counterpart in the 2% tax treatment. In other words, the
e0.20 tax crowds out voluntary donations from male participants by 400%.
Females who are subject to the 2% tax behave in a completely di¤erent way,
increasing their donations by an estimated e1.35 with respect to female par-
ticipants without the tax, representing crowding in of over 600%. While the
coe¢ cient for the 8% tax on male participants is not statistically signicant,
it points in the same direction as the one for the smaller 2% tax.
The results for the 30% tax are statistically signicant. As already
mentioned in subsection 3.4.2, the positive coe¢ cient for the variable 30%
tax female is driven mainly by two outliers. For male participants, we ob-
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Table 3.2: Donations by Tax Treatment
Tobit
donation donation
2% tax  0:22 (0:53)  1:15 (0:62)
8% tax 0:02 (0:58)  0:74 (0:68)
30% tax  0:98 (0:68)  2:35 (0:81)
female  2:01 (0:92)
2% tax female 2:38 (1:07)
8% tax female 2:02 (1:16)
30% tax female 3:12 (1:51)
constant 1:24 (0:55) 2:08 (0:57)
pseudo R2 0:03 0:04
observations 105 105
Notes:
(1) Base group: no tax no tax & male
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(3) All regressions include binary control variables for the individual charities.
(4) 31 left-censored, 2 right-censored observations.
(5) *, ** & *** denote statistically signicant di¤erence from zero at the 10%,
5% & 1% levels.
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serve incomplete crowding out of voluntary donations. The actual average
donation by men in the no-tax treatment is e2.09, less than the tax of e3.00,
so it would not be possible to witness 100% crowding out when comparing
both treatments. Yet our Tobit estimate predicts that the average male par-
ticipant paying a charity tax of e3.00 would actually prefer a rebate of e0.49
on his payment. There is still 78% crowding out of male voluntary donations
by the large tax.
We designed the experiment specically to investigate the e¤ect of a small,
a medium and a large charity tax on donor behavior. We have established for
male participants that the small 2% tax crowds out donations by more than
the value of the tax revenue, thus doing more harm than good in terms of
total contributions. Although the 30% tax only partially crowds out (male)
donations, it has a stronger absolute negative e¤ect on donations compared
to the smaller taxes.
We now consider briey the impact of the charity tax at the various rates
on the decision to donate, running probit regressions and again stratifying
the data by gender.
Table 3.3: Probit Regressions
Pr fdonation > 0g
male sample female sample
2% tax 0:02 (0:19) 0:44 (0:11)
8% tax  0:06 (0:17) 0:31 (0:12)
30% tax  0:47 (0:19) 0:03 (0:18)
observed probability 0:73 0:67
predicted probability 0:76 0:72
pseudo R2 0:18 0:32
observations 60 45
Notes:
(1) Figures reported are estimated marginal e¤ects relative to no tax.
(2) Robust standard errors for the underlying coe¢ cients in parentheses.
(3) All regressions include binary control variables for the individual charities.
(4) ** & *** denote statistically signicant di¤erence from zero at the 5% and 1% levels.
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The estimates in table 3.3 show that a small tax does not deter the male
participants from voluntarily donating money altogether in the same way
that the large tax does. A male participant paying the 2% charity tax is
just as likely to make a positive voluntary donation as his counterpart in
the treatment without tax (84% probability), whereas a male participant in
the 30% tax treatment is only likely to donate on top of the tax with 39%
probability. Yet as the Tobit results show, the 2% tax does reduce the size
of male donations, to the extent that total contributions are smaller relative
to a system of purely voluntary donations. Regarding female participants
decision to donate voluntarily, the story is in line with the previous regres-
sions. The predicted probability for a positive donation without a charity
tax is a mere 39%, but this increases signicantly with the 2% tax rate. In
other words, the small tax would seem to encourage female participants to
donate.
3.5 Conclusion and Outlook
Having set out to see if a charity tax generates higher contributions than
a system of purely voluntary donations, we have found mixed evidence. At
the aggregate level, tax crowds out donations by less than the one hundred
per cent predicted by our economic model. This suggests that a model with
warm glow (Andreoni, 1990) would better describe donor behavior. The high
tax of 30% certainly serves to increase charity revenue. Yet our small tax
of 2%, which is in fact more comparable to charity tax rates that exist in
the real world, actually lowered total contributions to the charities, doing
more harm than good and providing support for the notion of psychological
reactance among the male participants. Of course our results are only based
on incomes of e10 so they should not be interpreted in terms of charity-
tax incidence for the whole economy. Nevertheless, the participants in the
experiment did have to earn their money and from their comments in the
questionnaire it would seem that they took their decisions on the amount to
donate seriously and with care. If the results did hold for larger incomes,
the message from this study regarding charity taxes might be in the spirit of
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Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), tax enough or dont tax at all.
Our ndings regarding gender are complex and harder to explain. We are
not able to reject the null hypothesis of no signicant di¤erence between male
and female donations overall, and in contrast to other experimental studies
on giving, we have found that male participants actually donate signicantly
more than their female counterparts in a setting without tax. We are not
the rst to witness the crowding in of donations by government intervention,
indeed a strand of the literature on charity is devoted to matching dona-
tions,see e.g. Karlan and List (2007). Yet why this should only be the case
for women remains curious and perhaps deserves more attention in future
research.29
Finally, one question that our experimental design does not tackle is what
happens when the existing scal regime is changed. Participants in our ex-
periment were only subject to one scal setting. A follow-up experiment
might entail three working periods, with the opportunity to donate earnings
at the end of each period. Allowing participants to choose the amount freely
in the rst period, constraining them to a minimum contribution in the sec-
ond and then withdrawing this constraint in the nal period would provide
the possibility to gauge the consequences of reducing state intervention in
charitable giving.
29See Alesina et al. (2011) for an interesting discussion of why it may be legitimate to
di¤erentiate scal policy according to gender.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Two Solutions to the DonorsMaximization Prob-
lem
Here, we distinguish between two cases for solving the donors maximization
problem and demonstrate that we either obtain the corner solution with
a zero voluntary donation v = 0 or an interior solution with a voluntary
donation v > 0.
Corner Solution v = 0 if dU(x;c)
dv

v=0
 0
We rst show what happens if at the point of zero voluntary donations,
marginal utility from donating is less than or equal to zero dU(x;c)
dv

v=0
 0.
The donor decides on the voluntary donation that maximizes utility sub-
ject to her budget constraint,
max
v
U (x; c)
s.t. v  0
x+ c = w.
Substituting c = v + t, we have
max
v
U (w   v   t; v + t)
s.t. v  0.
In this case,
dU (x; c)
dv

v=0
 0, dU (w   t; t)
dv
 0.
This is equivalent to
 Ux (w   t; t) + Uc (w   t; t)  0
, Ux (w   t; t)  Uc (w   t; t) . (3.3)
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The donors marginal utility from personal consumption is at least as large
as her marginal utility from the total contributions she makes to the cause.
At this point, she would (weakly) prefer to spend her income on personal
consumption. Since donations are constrained to be nonnegative, utility is
maximized by donating nothing and we have the corner solution v = 0.
Interior Solution v > 0 if dU(x;c)
dv

v=0
> 0
In this case, the inequality (3.3) becomes
Uc (w   t; t) > Ux (w   t; t) .
Here, the donors marginal utility from the total contributions she makes
to the cause is greater than her marginal utility from personal consumption.
The tax alone does not cover the total amount the donor wishes to contribute
to the good cause so at this point, she prefers to donate a positive amount
from her income rather than spending it on personal consumption. Since by
assumption, Uc  0 and Ucc < 0, and dcdv = 1, we have an interior solution
to the maximization problem v > 0 that is characterized by the rst-order
condition dU
dv
= 0.
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3.6.2 Participant Demographics
The following table presents a break-down of the participant demographics
by treatment. Note that in the left-hand column Totalrepresents the whole
sample of 120 participants, while the individual treatment columns only con-
tain data from those participants who succeeded in earning the money to
donate.
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3.6.3 Experiment Instructions
Welcome Screen
Hello and welcome to this experiment!
Please read the following instructions for this experiment carefully. The
experiment will only begin when every participant has read the instructions
and clicked on the startbutton.
In this experiment you will have the opportunity to earn money. You will
be able to donate part of this money to a charity. Please have a look at the
information sheet provided to see the list of charities from which you may
choose, including descriptions of what each one stands for.
This experiment will be run in an anonymous way. The other participants
will not know about your decisions either during the experiment or when you
collect your payment. Communication with fellow participants is not allowed.
If you have any questions about the experimental procedure please raise your
hand and ask the experimenter quietly.
First we would like to ask you to choose one of the six charities described
in the information sheet for any donation you might make. You can choose
between the Blinden- und Sehbehindertenverein Köln e.V.[Cologne Associ-
ation for the Blind and Visually Impaired], the Hunger Project, Greenpeace,
Lebenswert e.V.[Value of Life,a charity for the care of cancer patients
and their families], UNICEF and the Cologne branch of the World Wildlife
Fund.
Now please choose one of the organizations:
 Blinden- und Sehbehindertenverein Köln e.V.
 The Hunger Project
 Greenpeace
 Lebenswert e.V.
 UNICEF
 World Wildlife Fund Cologne
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Task Description
You will have 15 minutes to solve simple arithmetic problems on the com-
puter. You can solve these problems as follows:
First add up the individual digits of two twelve-digit numbers separately.
Then compare the sums with each other. If the sum of the digits of the
rst number is larger than the sum of the digits of the second number then
subtract this second sum from the rst sum. If the sum of the digits of the
second number is greater than or equal to the sum of the digits of the rst
number then add both sums together.
For example:
123400000000
101010101010
                 
Answer: 4 because 10 > 6 and 10 6 = 4
Another example:
100000000023
101010101010
                  
Answer: 12 because 6  6 and 6 + 6 = 12
If you have solved 5 problems correctly at the end of the 15 minutes you
will receive the xed amount of e10.00.
[No-tax treatment]
You will have the possibility to donate an amount from these e10.00 to
your chosen charity [charity name]. Afterwards you will be asked to ll in a
short questionnaire.
[Tax treatment]
[tax rate]% of the e10.00 you have earned will be levied as a tax and
transferred to your chosen charity [charity name]. This corresponds to [tax
payment in euros]. Furthermore, you will have the possibility to donate an
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additional amount from your remaining [e10.00 minus tax payment] to your
chosen charity [charity name]. Afterwards you will be asked to ll in a short
questionnaire.
[All treatments]
You will be informed at the end of the working period whether or not you
have solved the minimum number of problems correctly. You will also receive
e2.50 for participating in this experiment. You will receive this amount even
if you have not solved the minimum number of problems correctly. If you
have understood these instructions please click on OK and the working
period will begin a few moments later.
Failure Screen
Unfortunately you did not solve the minimum number of problems correctly.
You will therefore only receive the e2.50 participation fee. Please ll in the
following questionnaire.
Donation Screen
Congratulations! You have solved the minimum number of problems and
thus earned e10.00.
[No-tax treatment]
Now you can donate an amount from your earnings of e10.00 to the
organization [charity name].
Please enter an amount between e0.00 and e10.00 into the box below
and conrm this by clicking on OK.
Your donation will be transferred to your chosen organization [charity
name] at the end of this experiment.
[Tax treatment]
[tax payment in euros] will be transferred as tax to the organization [char-
ity name].
Your net earnings therefore amount to [e10.00 minus tax payment].
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Now you can donate an amount from your net earnings of [e10.00 minus
tax payment] to the organization [charity name].
Please enter an amount between e0.00 and [e10.00 minus tax payment]
into the box below and conrm this by clicking on "OK".
Your donation as well as the tax payment will be transferred to your
chosen organization [charity name] at the end of this experiment.
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3.6.4 Nonparametric Tests
Here, we present details of all nonparametric tests cited in the main text. For
purposes of comparison, we begin with results from (a) standard Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests. A key assumption of this method is that the vari-
abilities of the independent sample distributions are the same (Siegel and
Castellan Jr., 1988, p. 137). As is evident from gures 3.3 and 3.5, this
is not the case with our data and the assumption is thus violated. Indeed,
we should not expect these distributions to be identical since the range of
values from which the participants can freely choose to donate di¤ers by
treatment. We therefore also present results from (b) robust rank-order tests
according to Fligner and Policello II (1981). This method is essentially a
modication of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test where the assumption of
the underlying sample distributions being the same is dropped. We conclude
the comparisons with (c) median tests.
Table 3.5: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test, no tax vs. 2% tax
Treatment Observations Rank Sum Expected
no tax 24 624 612
2% tax 26 651 663
Combined 50 1275 1275
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic 0:235 ; p-value 0:814
Table 3.6: Fligner-Policello Robust Rank-Order Test, no tax vs. 2% tax
Treatment Observations Mean Preceding Obs. Variability Index
no tax 24 13:50 2654:50
2% tax 26 11:54 470:96
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic 0:209 ; p-value 0:834
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Table 3.7: Median Test, no tax vs. 2% tax
greater than the median no tax 2% tax Total
no 10 16 26
yes 14 10 24
Total 24 26 50
H 0: median contribution (no tax)  median contribution (2% tax)
H 1: median contribution (no tax) > median contribution (2% tax)
Test statistic 1:974 ; p-value 0:131
Table 3.8: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test, no tax vs. 8% tax
Treatment Observations Rank Sum Expected
no tax 24 566:5 624
8% tax 27 759:5 702
Combined 51 1326 1326
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (8% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (8% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic  1:095 ; p-value 0:274
Table 3.9: Fligner-Policello Robust Rank-Order Test, no tax vs. 8% tax
Treatment Observations Mean Preceding Obs. Variability Index
no tax 24 11:10 2073:99
8% tax 27 14:13 820:30
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (8% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (8% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic  1:041 ; p-value 0:298
Table 3.10: Median Test, no tax vs. 8% tax
greater than the median no tax 8% tax Total
no 15 19 34
yes 9 8 17
Total 24 27 51
H 0: median contribution (no tax)  median contribution (8% tax)
H 1: median contribution (no tax) > median contribution (8% tax)
Test statistic 0:354 ; p-value 0:383
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Table 3.11: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test, no tax vs. 30% tax
Treatment Observations Rank Sum Expected
no tax 24 340 636
30% tax 28 1038 742
Combined 52 1378 1378
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (30% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (30% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic  5:519 ; p-value 0:000
Table 3.12: Fligner-Policello Robust Rank-Order Test, no tax vs. 30% tax
Treatment Observations Mean Preceding Obs. Variability Index
no tax 24 1:67 783:33
30% tax 28 22:57 12:86
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (30% tax)g = 1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (30% tax)g 6= 1
2
Test statistic  10:251 ; p-value 0:000
Table 3.13: Median Test, no tax vs. 30% tax
greater than the median no tax 30% tax Total
no 22 15 37
yes 2 13 15
Total 24 28 52
H 0: median contribution (no tax)  median contribution (30% tax)
H 1: median contribution (no tax) < median contribution (30% tax)
Test statistic 9:137 ; p-value 0:003
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Table 3.14: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test for gender di¤erence (no tax)
Treatment Observations Rank Sum Expected
male 14 208 175
female 10 92 125
Combined 24 300 300
H 0: Pr fcontribution (male) > contribution (female)g  1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (male) > contribution (female)g > 1
2
Test statistic 1:999 ; p-value 0:023
Table 3.15: Fligner-Policello Robust Rank-Order Test for gender di¤erence
(no tax)
Treatment Observations Mean Preceding Obs. Variability Index
male 14 7:36 71:21
female 10 3:70 121:60
H 0: Pr fcontribution (male) > contribution (female)g  1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (male) > contribution (female)g > 1
2
Test statistic 2:225 ; p-value 0:013
Table 3.16: Median Test for gender di¤erence (no tax)
greater than the median male female Total
no 7 8 15
yes 7 2 9
Total 14 10 24
H 0: median contribution (male)  median contribution (female)
H 1: median contribution (male) > median contribution (female)
Test statistic 2:240 ; p-value 0:143
Table 3.17: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test, no tax vs. 2% tax, males only
Treatment Observations Rank Sum Expected
no tax 14 243 210
2% tax 15 192 225
Combined 29 435 435
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g  1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g > 1
2
Test statistic 1:458 ; p-value 0:072
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Table 3.18: Fligner-Policello Robust Rank-Order Test, no tax vs. 2% tax,
males only
Treatment Observations Mean Preceding Obs. Variability Index
no tax 14 9:86 355:21
2% tax 15 4:80 146:90
H 0: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g  1
2
H 1: Pr fcontribution (no tax) > contribution (2% tax)g > 1
2
Test statistic 1:408 ; p-value 0:080
Table 3.19: Median Test, no tax vs. 2% tax, males only
greater than the median no tax 2% tax Total
no 5 11 16
yes 9 4 13
Total 14 15 29
H 0: median contribution (no tax)  median contribution (2% tax)
H 1: median contribution (no tax) > median contribution (2% tax)
Test statistic 4:144 ; p-value 0:048
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3.6.5 Qualitative Evidence of Psychological Reactance
Here, we present four cases where participantsresponses to the open ques-
tions Please provide a reason for the amount you donatedor Please ex-
plain why you donated nothing appear to be in line with psychological
reactance theory (Brehm, 1966).
Age: 23; sex: male; chosen charity: Greenpeace; tax: e0.80
Donation: e1.20
Reason for the amount donated:
I thought we should be allowed to choose freely how much money to
donate. When I was forced to donate at least e0.80 I felt taken aback. I nd
this procedure unfair (I wasnt even given the chance to donate e0.00) and
therefore onlydonated e1.20.
Age: 30; sex: male; chosen charity: Cologne Association for the Blind
and Visually Impaired; tax: e0.20
Donation: e0.80
Reason for the amount donated:
Im not sure if I would have donated more in other circumstances, but I
felt a little bit taken aback.
Age: 22; sex: male; chosen charity: The Hunger Project; tax: e0.80
Donation: e0.00
Reason for no donation:
I would like to choose myself to whom or what I donate money. I do not
want to be forced to choose between preselected organizations. None of the
charities convinced me.
Age: 21; sex: female; chosen charity: UNICEF; tax: e3.00
Donation: e0.00
Reason for no donation:
I prefer to donate privately elsewhere because I do not want to be limited
to UNICEF. Other organizations also do good work and I would rather share
[my money] among them rather than limiting myself to one organization.
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3.6.6 Distribution of Voluntary Donations by Tax and
Gender
Table 3.20: Donations by Tax and Gender
no tax 2% tax 8% tax 30% tax
range (e) m f m f m f m f total
0 = v 2 6 2 1 4 1 8 7 31
0 < v < 1 1 7 4 3 2 1 2 20
1  v < 2 2 3 5 6 4 3 2 25
2  v < 3 7 4 2 1 1 2 17
3  v < 4 1 1 2
4  v < 5 1 1 3 1 1 7
5  v < 6
6  v < 7 1 1
7  v 2 2
0  v 14 10 15 11 18 9 13 15 105
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3.6.7 Charity Tax and Work E¤ort
In this subsection we demonstrate that work e¤ort was not signicantly af-
fected by the tax. In the probit regression we estimate the e¤ects of the
di¤erent charity tax levels on the probability of failure to earn e10 (by not
achieving the minimum of ve correctly completed tasks) relative to the
no-tax treatment. The marginal e¤ects of the tax treatments are negative
because the highest number of failures was in the no-tax treatment (6 out
of 30) but they are not statistically signicant. In the OLS regression the
dependent variable success rate measures e¤ort along both quantitative and
qualitative dimensions, being dened as the number of correctly completed
tasks divided by the number of tasks attempted (i.e. not only howmany tasks
but also how well these tasks were performed). On average, three quarters of
tasks were completed correctly. There is no signicant e¤ect of the charity
taxes on work e¤ort by this measure either. The lack of correlation between
tax level and work e¤ort may be due to income being xed beyond ve cor-
rectly completed tasks. If income were to depend linearly on the number
of correct answers then there would be greater scope for tax-(dis)incentive
e¤ects.
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Table 3.21: Work E¤ort by Tax Treatment
Probit(2) OLS
Pr fcorrect answers < 5g success rate(3)
2% tax  0:05 (0:07)  0:00 (0:06)
8% tax  0:08 (0:06) 0:03 (0:06)
30% tax  0:11 (0:06) 0:07 (0:06)
observed probability 0:13
predicted probability 0:12
pseudo R2 0:03
constant 0:74 (0:04)
R2 0:02
observations 120 120
Notes:
(1) Base group: no tax no tax
(2) Figures reported are estimated marginal e¤ects relative to no tax.
(3) success rate = correct answersattempted tasks
(4) Standard errors in parentheses.
(5) *** denotes statistically signicant di¤erence from zero at the 1% level.
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Chapter 4
Gender Di¤erences in Formal
and Informal Volunteering in
Germany1
4.1 Introduction
Many studies nd di¤erences in volunteer activity between men and women
(see Low et al., 2007; Hackl et al., 2012, for two examples). In Germany,
men are more likely to engage in formal voluntary activity, but women are
more likely to be informal volunteers. We posit that the relationship between
formal and informal volunteering participation di¤ers across gender. Using
detailed time-use survey data from Germany, we nd evidence supporting
this hypothesis. Our use of German data to explore this question augments
the current body of research in two ways. First, we show that gender dif-
ferences in volunteering behavior are not unique to the culture of the USA,
where more prior research exists. We extend the literature by considering
the specic structure of the voluntary sector in Germany, and evaluate altru-
ism and gender using national survey data. Second, the very high response
rate of the German data (98%) dwarfs that of data from other countries,
and particularly the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) (close to 50%).
1This chapter is based on Helms and McKenzie (2013).
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As such, typical concerns regarding nonresponse with the measurement of
volunteering behavior with surveys are greatly mitigated.2
4.2 Background
The distinction between formal and informal volunteering has been acknowl-
edged in several previous studies (Low et al., 2007; Schwarz, 1996; Taniguchi,
2012; Lee and Brudney, 2012; Carson, 1999). We use the survey denitions
of formal and informal volunteering from our dataset. Formal volunteering
is dened as honorary or voluntary work that is not performed directly for
individuals but rather for an organization.Examples cited in the question-
naire include work for associations, schools, nurseries, neighborhood groups,
committees, other administrative workas well as collecting money for
an organization.Within Germany, there are several kinds of organizations
in which volunteer activity takes place, including youth, education, health,
rescue, and religious organizations. Work in sports, hobbies, and cultural
and art clubs accounts for the largest proportion of the voluntary sector, in
terms of the proportion of the population involved in it. We dene informal
volunteering in a manner consistent with our data, as informal help for other
households.Informal volunteering (or informal helping) includes looking af-
ter children, working in the garden, cleaning and tidying up, shopping, help
in legal matters, help in insurance and other o¢ cial matters, counseling and
advice about problems, care for the elderly/ill, repairs and building work,
automobile maintenance, looking after pets, preparing meals, transportation
and helping move house, and nancial assistance (German time-use dataset
Zeitbudgeterhebung 2001/2002, EVAS-No. 6391). A dening feature of
informal volunteering is that any work or service provided is not for ones
own household.
The recent literature considers motivations for formal volunteering and
prosocial behavior. Previous studies have developed theoretical models of vol-
2See, for example, Abraham et al. (2009), who show how higher nonresponse rates
can inate estimates of volunteering behavior, though higher rates do not alter inferences
about volunteering covariates.
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unteering, with attention to external, internal and image motivations (Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009; Carpenter and Myers, 2010). While
there are many models, most condense to three basic motives concern for
the size of the public good (public goods motive), concern for ones per-
sonal contribution to the public good (warm glow motive), and concerns
for ones own human capital development (human capital enhancing motive)
(Andreoni, 1990; Anheier and Salamon, 1999; Ziemek, 2006).
While the literature suggests that many forms of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation underlie volunteering, whether or not an individual decides to
volunteer depends on the availability of time, levels of ability and education,
and the networks within which he or she is embedded. Parboteeah et al.
(2004) nd that individuals with higher levels of human capital, social capital,
and cultural capital (religion) are more likely to volunteer formally, and Lee
and Brudney (2012) demonstrate how human capital is an important factor
in formal but not informal volunteering.
A few studies consider volunteering in Germany and its motivation specif-
ically. The division and subsequent reunication of Germanys eastern and
western regions sparked many studies on the e¤ect of the reunication on
people from both sides. Meier and Stutzer (2008) exploit the reunication
to consider the impact of volunteering and altruistic behavior on happiness.
The authors examine the di¤erential motivations for prosocial behavior, and
posit (and nd) that such di¤erences lead volunteers to di¤erent types of
organizations.
Earlier studies also examine di¤erences between men and women in mat-
ters of altruism (see Taniguchi, 2006; Wilson and Musick, 1997; Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001, for some examples). The existing literature suggests that
women are more generous than men in their monetary donations to char-
ity, both in terms of the likelihood of making a gift and in some instances
the amount given (Piper and Schnepf, 2008). Previous research on gender
and volunteering in the USA has found that women are more likely than
men to volunteer their time too (Taniguchi, 2006). Wymer (2011) considers
concepts from biology, neuroscience and psychology to investigate how and
why women di¤er from men in their volunteer behavior, nding that women
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prefer to volunteer for organizations that help needy people and infants, chil-
dren and youth, while men are more attracted than women to roles that
involve a degree of risk-taking and danger. Rotolo and Wilson (2007) nd
that male volunteers in the United States are more likely to be in volunteer
leadership positions than are females. Earlier work has shown that in Ger-
many, contrary to the USA, men are more likely than women to volunteer
for an organization. However, it also shows that when it comes to the types
of activities by gender, the pattern is similar in both countries: in Germany,
women are more likely to be involved in school, religious, and health orga-
nizations, whereas men are more involved in public safety and professional
organizations and are more likely to be involved in positions of power (Eu-
ropean Volunteer Centre, 2004). These same patterns are seen elsewhere in
German society (von Rosenbladt, 2000, p. 20):
Womens involvement is more family-related and socially de-
ned. Men, on the other hand, prefer areas of greater professional
relevance and with more prestige. Functional and leadership roles
are a characteristic of their activity prole. The gender-specic
division of labor in society as a whole thus also results in gender-
specic segmenting of volunteering.
Wilson and Musick (1997) acknowledge that women are more likely to
engage in informal volunteer activities and that gender may impact the deci-
sions to volunteer formally and informally in di¤erent ways. They nd that
formal volunteering increases informal volunteering. However, they nd no
evidence that informal volunteering increases (or decreases) formal volun-
teering.
Andreoni et al. (2003) nd that some married couples negotiate how much
money to give to charity and thus the decision to give is made jointly. It could
be that the costs and benets of volunteering are shared between people living
in the same household and that the decision for an individual to volunteer also
depends on other household members. While we are not able to model such
decision-making processes explicitly, our analysis does account for correlation
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between the volunteer behavior of individuals from the same household as
well as for the general e¤ects of household composition.
Given these documented di¤erences in altruistic behavior between men
and women, we aim to increase our understanding of the interaction between
gender and volunteering behavior. We use detailed data to examine the rela-
tionship between the formal and informal volunteering decisions of men and
women. In particular, we consider whether German volunteering behavior
indicates that individuals treat the activities as complements or substitutes.
Following previous ndings from the ATUS (Taniguchi, 2012), we expect
that women will be more likely than men to be involved in both formal and
informal volunteering. Using data on labor-force participation, we then in-
vestigate whether the complementarity of the two types of voluntary activity
can be explained by lower labor-force participation of women.
4.3 Empirical Model
We develop a bivariate probit model to estimate the probabilities of partici-
pating in formal and informal volunteering simultaneously.3 Bivariate probit
estimations have been used previously to study the relationship between mi-
grant remittances and charitable giving (Osili and Du, 2005) and precedents
for their application to formal and informal volunteering exist in Hank and
Stuck (2008) and Taniguchi (2012). Lee and Brudney (2012) use a bivariate
probit model to show that human capital is a key determinant of the deci-
sion to volunteer formally while it is not related to the decision to help others
informally.
Many of the factors inuencing an individuals decision to volunteer for-
mally will also inuence the decision to volunteer informally. Using the bi-
variate probit model controls for such endogeneity, producing an estimate
of the residual correlation between the two decisions, i.e., after accounting
for the e¤ects of other factors specied in the model. We are particularly
interested in the correlation parameter  in our analysis of gender di¤erences
3For more information on bivariate probit models, see Greene (2002, pp.849-857).
75
in volunteering.
We estimate the following pair of simultaneous equations separately for
our male and female subsamples:
Vf = 
0
1X + "1 (4.1)
Vi = 
0
2X + "2 (4.2)
where Vf = 1 if positive hours of formal volunteering are reported and 0 oth-
erwise; Vi = 1 if positive hours of informal volunteering are reported and 0
otherwise; X is a set of covariates, including marital status, household type,
education level, employment status, age dummies, an indicator for individ-
uals living in what was formerly East Germany, and an indicator we label
spiritual,which takes on the value of one if spending any time attending
religious services/ celebrations or praying or practising any other spiritual
activity is/are recorded; "1 and "2 represent error terms that follow a stan-
dard bivariate normal distribution and are correlated with covariance matrixP
=
"
1 
 1
#
.
The parameter  measures the remaining correlation between formal and
informal volunteering after having accounted for the covariates included in
X. We consider how  gives insight into the relationship between formal and
informal volunteering. If  > 0, the decision to help informally is positively
correlated with the decision to volunteer formally, consistent with the two ac-
tivities being complementary. If  < 0, the decision to help out informally is
negatively correlated with participation in formal volunteering, which implies
that the two types of volunteering are substitutes in consumptionpeople do
either one or the other. If there is no statistically-distinguishable correlation
between formal and informal volunteering, the two decisions are not consid-
ered jointly beyond what is already identied through the covariatesX in this
analysis. In addition to our hypotheses about general participation by men
and women, we expect  > 0, consistent with a complementary relationship
between formal and informal volunteering. Our expectations are stronger for
women than for men.
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4.4 Data
To consider formal and informal volunteering for men and women, we use
the German Time Use Dataset, which contains nationally representative data
from a survey of 5,500 households (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002). A unique
feature of the survey is its particularly high response rate of 98%. The dataset
was commissioned by the German Federal Statistical O¢ ce and conducted
between April 2001 and March 2002.4 The data have two componentsa
Time Use Survey (TUS), and a Time Use Diary (TUD). The TUS contains
general information about the respondents, including the types of organiza-
tions for which they volunteer. The TUD includes a detailed account of each
participants activities over three diary days, in 10-min increments. Each
individual in the household over age ten is included in the study (Blanke,
1993). We limit our study to individuals aged 1865, to focus on the decisions
of working-age adults.
Using time diary data to study volunteer activity reduces the likelihood
that study participants will be swayed by concerns of social acceptability. If
volunteering activity is viewed as a social good, then surveys are susceptible
to upward bias, as respondents exaggerate their involvement in such activ-
ities. However, time diaries are recorded as a chronological record of the
respondents day. As such, diary data will be less prone to social desirability
bias.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
We present descriptive statistics for the data we use in tables 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3. In table 4.1, we show the summary statistics for formal and informal
volunteering in the TUD. We adjust all estimates for structural di¤erences
between the survey sample and census population data using the weighting
variable provided in the dataset. We also use a household identier in our
calculations of standard errors, thus accounting for intra-cluster correlation
among individuals from the same household. Activities are reported as the
4See www.destatis.de and Statistisches Bundesamt (2002).
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total minutes spent in the activity over a three-day period. Formal volun-
teering in the TUD is dened as honorary or voluntary work that is not
performed directly for individuals but rather for an organization.We cre-
ate a binary variable from these data which takes the value one for positive
minutes, to indicate any formal volunteering. Overall, 11.5% of respondents
volunteered for an organization. This is at best an underestimation of total
participation in volunteering due to a non-sampling problem in only observ-
ing activities over 3 days.5 Among males, 13.1% report formal volunteering
activities, which is higher than the rate for females at 9.9% (p < 0:01). Col-
umn 2 in table 4.1 contains the mirror statistics for informal volunteering.
The gender pattern is the reverse of that for formal volunteering, with women
reporting more informal help than men: 18.6% of females help informally,
while only 15.6% of men do so (p < 0:01).
Table 4.1: Participation in Formal and Informal Volunteering
(1) (2)
Formal volunteering Informal volunteering
Mean (95% C.I.) Mean (95% C.I.) N
Overall 11.5% (10.612.5) 17.1% (15.918.3) 8583
Male 13.1% (11.714.5) 15.6% (14.017.1) 3984
Female 9.9% (8.811.1) 18.6% (17.120.2) 4599
Weighted estimates for respondents of working age (1865 years old)
C.I. = condence interval
Source: German time-use dataset "Zeitbudgeterhebung" 2001/2002, EVAS-No. 6391
Table 4.2 documents participation rates in di¤erent types of voluntary
organizations by gender from the TUS.6 At 23.9%, participation is particu-
larly high in the category, sport and exercise, hobbies or culture and music,
and the proportion of men volunteering for such organizations is signicantly
higher than that of women. Since general participation in each of the other
5The diary was generally completed on 2 weekdays and 1 weekend day per person,
which leads to a slight bias in favor of weekend days. Since this is true for both women
and men and our aim is to explain gender di¤erences, we do not consider it further in our
analysis.
6Some people report volunteering for more than one type of organization, so the sum
of the rows does not accurately reect the general rate of participation in volunteering.
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types of organization is less than 10%, the particular structure of the vol-
untary sector in Germany (with its large sports and hobbies subsector) may
explain why higher proportions of men are found to volunteer formally there,
while the opposite is true in the USA. Nevertheless, as Wymer (2011) found
for the USA, men in Germany appear more prone to volunteer in roles that
involve risk and danger, as a signicantly higher proportion of men volun-
teers for the accident and rescue services, while women tend to volunteer for
organizations in the social, health, education, and religion sectors. These
ndings echo the results of the European Volunteer Centre (2004) mentioned
in section 4.2.
Table 4.2: Participation in Volunteering by Organization Type
Organization type All Males Females
Civic, political or professional 7.8 10.9 4.7
School, kindergarten, youth, 9.1 7.1 11.2
or adult education
Environmental, nature, or 2.3 3.0 1.6
animal protection
Health 1.4 1.2 1.6
Accident and rescue service, 3.1 5.6 0.5
or voluntary re service
Religious 9.5 7.4 11.7
Social, seniors, or womens group 7.1 4.6 9.7
Sport and exercise, hobbies, 23.9 27.0 20.8
or culture and music
Other 3.9 4.5 3.3
Sample N 8583 3984 4599
Weighted participation rates (%) for respondents of working age (1865 years old)
Source: German time-use dataset "Zeitbudgeterhebung" 2001/2002, EVAS-No. 6391
We combine our data on formal and informal volunteering to examine dif-
ferences between male and female volunteering in more detail. As a precursor
to the analysis, table 4.3 displays the summary statistics for the models co-
variates, both for the sample as a whole and for the subsamples of those who
report formal volunteering and those who report informal volunteering at
some point during the three-day period. In our sample of 18 to 65-year-olds,
we nd involvement in one type of volunteering increases the probability of
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involvement in the other. This is most apparent among women who volunteer
formally, where the proportion of informal helpers jumps to 28% (from 18.6%
among all women sampled). The latter nding is also consistent with earlier
evidence showing that formal volunteering encourages informal volunteering
(Wilson and Musick, 1997).
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The remaining rows of table 4.3 show the demographic composition of
the sample. Individuals with higher levels of education are more involved
than those who are still in school or dropouts. The German Abitur is
the highest level of school education, providing the right to university en-
trance; Hauptrefers to the school-leaving certicate obtained at the basic
level Hauptschule,usually leading to apprenticeship for a blue-collar job.
Real is the mid-level qualication from a Realschule,which is usually
followed by a formal kind of vocational training. Over two-thirds of men
work full time (69.9%), while just one-third of women do (34.1%). Impor-
tantly for our analysis, a signicantly higher proportion of women have no
workforce participation compared to men (41.5 and 26.9%, respectively).
Full-time workers make up a smaller proportion of female volunteers (both
formal and informal) compared with women in general. Among men, the
labor-force participation breakdown is similar among both non-volunteers
and formal/informal volunteers.
A few other important di¤erences emerge between men and women, and
volunteers and non-volunteers. Consistent with earlier studies, eastern Ger-
many residents make up a smaller proportion of volunteers than they do for
Germany as a whole (Meier and Stutzer, 2008). Most people of working
age are married, and roughly half have children who live in the household.
The formal volunteer population is similar to the rest of the population with
respect to family and household composition and education, while informal
volunteers are less likely to have children in the household. Those report-
ing religious activities form a larger part of both the formal and informal
volunteer populations relative to the population as a whole.
The purpose of the analysis in the following section is to determine the
correlation between formal and informal volunteering by gender. We also con-
sider whether the correlation depends simply on available time, or whether
those who volunteer both informally for neighbors/friends as well as for for-
mal organizations do so in spite of time constraints.
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4.6 Analysis and Discussion
We apply the bivariate probit model from section 4.3 to the data, separating
by gender. Table 4.4 reports the results. The reference group in each case is a
married person with children, holding a midrange Realschool-leaving cer-
ticate, currently in full-time employment, non-spiritual and living in western
Germany. We show estimated marginal e¤ects on volunteering by gender for
four possible outcomes that are not mutually exclusive: the marginal ef-
fects on the decision to volunteer formally (columns 1 and 2); to volunteer
informally (columns 3 and 4); to volunteer formally given participation in
informal volunteering (columns 5 and 6) and to volunteer informally given
participation in formal volunteering (columns 7 and 8). The Predicted P
row displays the estimated participation rates for the four categories. The
other rows list the marginal (additional) e¤ects for the di¤erence between
a zero and unitary value of the respective covariate. For example, a non-
spiritual male from the reference group has an 11.5% probability of being a
formal volunteer. The probability of his spiritual counterpart volunteering
for a formal organization is 8.7 percentage points higher at 20.2%. This nd-
ing echoes other studies, where religiosity (here spirituality) has been found
to be a major driver of formal volunteering (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003;
Keeter et al., 2002).
For both men and women, schooling (and the subsequent position in
society) a¤ects the probability of involvement in formal volunteering. Among
men, the e¤ect is strongest for dropouts, who have lower participation rates
in both formal and informal volunteering. On the other hand, for women the
e¤ect tends towards higher rates of participation for higher levels of education
(Abitur). This indicates a connection between human capital and formal
volunteering as described by Lee and Brudney (2012). Among women our
results are more pronounced; younger women are signicantly less likely to
participate in both activities and those in the older category are signicantly
more likely to volunteer both formally and informally.
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One possible explanation for our nding that more women than men
volunteer informally is that women are far less likely to be in full-time work
than men and may therefore have more time to o¤er help to neighboring
households. Indeed, while work commitments seem to play no role in the
decision to volunteer for men, women who are not working or who work
part time are far more likely to volunteer in both formal and informal ways.
Taniguchi (2006) nds similar results regarding employment status for female
participation in the USA. Interestingly, women in part-time employment are
more likely to volunteer and help than their counterparts who are not in work.
This indicates that the decision to volunteer is not solely determined by time
available due to work commitments, though we recognize that in German
society, women are generally the primary carers of children and managers
of the house. The fact that we nd these work-commitment di¤erences for
women and not for men may be because full-time employment is the norm
for men (70% of working-age men) whereas there is far greater variation in
employment among women (the largest group of whom, 42%, are not in work,
while only 34% of the working-age population are full-time). Bearing this
in mind, we also run the estimations on the subsample of full-time workers,
which is explained in detail below.
We now focus attention on the parameter , which represents the remain-
ing correlation between formal and informal volunteering over and above that
which is due to the set of covariates X. As shown in the bottom half of table
4.4, we nd no residual correlation between informal and formal volunteering
for our male sample (we cannot reject  = 0). However, we nd that the
remaining correlation between formal and informal volunteering for women
is positive ( = 0:145) and statistically signicant. The positive value of
 is suggestive of a complementary relationship between formal and infor-
mal volunteering. Since we control for part-time work commitments and
non-workers, this is not just capturing the importance of employment in the
decision to volunteer.
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Indeed, when restricting the analysis to the subsample of full-time work-
ers, as shown in table 4.5, the result is accentuated: for women in full-time
employment, the surplus correlation between those who volunteer informally
and those who volunteer formally jumps to  = 0:427. This result is signif-
icant at the 1 per cent level and is within the range of the formal-informal
volunteering residual correlations reported in earlier studies ( = 0:186 in
Hank and Stuck, 2008,  = 0:105 in Taniguchi, 2012 and  = 0:82 in Lee
and Brudney, 2012). Among women working full time, we do not see evi-
dence of substitution between formal and informal helping, but instead see
strong evidence of complementarity. Among full-time employed men, the re-
lationship between formal and informal helping is positive but insignicant.
Among the subsample of full-time workers, education is a stronger predictor
of volunteering behavior, in the expected direction.
Our model furthers the understanding of gender di¤erences in the decision-
making process for helping activities. The persistently strong correlation be-
tween formal and informal volunteering for women after having controlled for
other factors that inuence both activities suggests that formal and informal
volunteering decisions are complementary for women. We do not nd the
same relationship regarding the male decision to volunteer.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the gender di¤erences in formal and in-
formal volunteering using data from a TUS in Germany. When we consider
the correlation between formal and informal volunteering that remains after
having controlled for the observed determinants of both activities, we nd
clear di¤erences between men and women. Women who volunteer informally
are more likely to also volunteer formally, suggesting a complementarity.
There is no signicant connection between male formal and informal vol-
unteering. The gender di¤erence does not seem to be primarily driven by
the greater involvement of men in full-time employment and the consequent
time constraint. Our analysis shows that men who only work part-time or
are unemployed are no more likely to volunteer for organizations or help in-
90
formally than those working full time. Moreover, the positive link between
informal and formal volunteering among women is even stronger in the sam-
ple of women who work full time. Our study adds to the existing literature
on gender di¤erences in volunteering motivations and behavior, and provides
further insight into the complex relationship between the decisions to volun-
teer formally and informally. Furthermore, the data in our study have not
previously been used for this purpose; as a result, ours is among the rst
to establish the relationship with German data. Our ndings are consistent
with studies using data from other countries, suggestive of persistent gender
di¤erences in volunteering behaviorformal or informalacross countries. Yet
it remains unclear as to why such di¤erences should persist. For example,
is the strong relationship between formal and informal volunteering among
women due to their particular social networks and do such networks expand
with participation in paid employment (while not being the case for men)?
Future work may seek to test such hypotheses and provide some explanations
for gender di¤erences that we observe.
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